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A “pawn” is defined as: to take a pledge or risk (as a verb); or a person serving
as security or hostage (as a noun); or one of eight men of one color and of the lowest value,
usually moved one square at a time vertically and capturing diagonally (in Chess); or someone
who is used or manipulated to further another person’s purposes. WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 827 (3rd ed. 2008) (emphasis added). It is the latter of these definitions that the
author focuses on in reference to the banking industry’s use of borrowers to further the
industry’s profit interests.
2
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“BEWARE . . . we exist close to a state of war of every man
against every man and where life in the housing market can
often be ‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.’”3
I. INTRODUCTION
The banking and financial services industry’s use of its political
power and money, in pursuit of maximizing profits, reshaped the
fundamentals of American homeownership policy.4 It was through this
pursuit that the commercial banking and Wall Street financial services
institutions (BFSI)5 usurped the government’s powerful functions over
3
See David J. Reiss, Message in a Mortgage: What Dodd-Frank’s “Qualified
Mortgage” Tells Us About Ourselves, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 717, 721 (2012) [hereinafter
Reiss, Message in a Mortgage] (emphasis added) (citing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 57
(J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford World’s Classics 2011) (1651)), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2018940 (explaining that borrowers and lenders are in a constant state of competition
so if a large entity secures an advantage over an individual in the market, then the entity will
take advantage of that opportunity to win or make money).
4
To avoid confusion in the references, federal housing policy may also include
policies related to rent control, affordable housing, and ownership in general. The author’s
reference to federal homeownership policy specifically refers to homeownership through
programs used to promote mortgage lending and credit markets. See David J. Reiss, Three
Principles for Federal Housing Policy, 26 PROB. & PROP. 40, 42 (2012) [hereinafter Reiss,
Three Principles for Housing Policy].
5
Throughout this article, the phrase “banking and financial service industry” and
the acronym “BFSI” are used interchangeably to mean the commercial banks and Wall Street
financial investment firms that benefited from government bailout funds in 2007, as discussed
later in the article. Under the federal banking system, the banking and financial services (or
non-banking) industry encompasses commercial banks, thrifts (or money market mutual
funds), brokers, investment banks, and insurance companies, as a single entity for the
purposes of this article. See E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ARE
BANKS SPECIAL?, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT (1982), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.
org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.cfm. Corrigan notes that there are three characteristics that distinguish
banks from all other non-banking institutions: (1) offering of transaction accounts; (2) serving
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regulation, oversight, and standard-setting regarding homeownership
policymaking.6 Although the government intended these functions to create a
transparent marketplace to benefit both private and public participants,7 the
BFSI relied on its corporate power and wealth8 to influence such government
functions, which ultimately affected the evolution of homeownership
policymaking in several ways. First, the BFSI captured the federal regulatory
framework that allows it to operate in a neoclassical economic fashion
without any checks and balances on its self-regulatory standards.9 Second,
the BFSI used its wealth to manipulate laws that were intended to create
checks and balances on the industry to avoid economic catastrophe,
especially given past economic crises.10 Third, the BFSI influenced the
federal policymakers through lobbying efforts to such a substantial extent
as a backup source of liquidity for all other institutions; and (3) playing a key role in monetary
policy. Id. at 2.
6
Michael S. Carliner, Development of Federal Homeownership Policy, 9
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 299, 318 (Fannie Mae Foundation 1998), available at
http://www.michaelcarliner.com/HPD98-OwnershipPolicy.pdf. Carliner set forth three
mechanisms used to exercise federal government policy toward homeownership: (1) tax
benefits; (2) regulation of and participation in the financial system; and (3) direct subsidies to
producers and consumers. Id. at 300; see generally J. Michael Collins, Towards a Strategic
Federal Policy Promoting Homeownership, FED. HOMEOWNERSHIP POL’Y 2 (2004), available
at http://www.policylabconsulting.com/documents/UNC%20HO%20Policy.pdf. This article
focuses on the second mechanism: regulation.
7
See Collins, supra note 6, at 2; see also Carliner, supra note 6, at 318 (stating
most programs promoting homeownership have been created for some other purpose).
8
See generally STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME
CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW 37 (2012) [hereinafter RAMIREZ,
LAWLESS CAPITALISM].
9
See Charles J. Abrams, Fannie and Freddie Flipped: A Backward Induction
Analysis of the GSEs’ Meltdown, 3 WM. & MARY POL'Y REV. 157, 163 (2011) (stating that due
to these lobbying efforts and the government guarantee, Fannie and Freddie were permitted to
hold highly leveraged balance sheets); see generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 495 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC], available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf; Edward Pinto, Acorn and the Housing Bubble, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 12, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703298004
574459763052141456; Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(finding that the speakers, such as industry lobbyists, have influence over—or access to—
elected officials). The court in Citizens United stated:
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative
politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain
policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors
who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and
legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a
contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will
respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.
Democracy is premised on responsiveness.
Id. at 359 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
10
For example, during various economic crises, presidents have implemented
legislation to address the problem. See Carliner, supra note 6, at 309–10.
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that the federal housing policy has been reshaped to meet the industry’s
needs, rather than adequately protecting national economic or consumer
interests. The BFSI’s motivation for capturing and molding homeownership
policy is profit maximization, at any expense.
This article analyzes how the commercial banking and Wall Street
financial services industry disregarded regulatory policies directed at safety
and soundness, and used its wealth and power to manipulate consumers,
politicians, regulatory agencies, rating agencies, and even a few of its own
members,11 as pawns to serve its insatiable greed. Because of the increasing
interconnectedness within the BFSI12 that fed the continued drive for everincreasing profiteering in the residential mortgage and securitization
markets,13 financial institutions within the industry caused a catastrophic
financial collapse, not only within the BFSI but also the national and
international economies, when the risky securitized mortgage products the
BFSI introduced into the markets became unstable.14 The ripple effect15 of
11

Darrell Issa, Unaffordable Housing and Political Kickbacks Rocked the
American Economy, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 407, 418–19 (2010). Other pawns include
mortgage brokers, appraisers, underwriters, and any other provider necessary for the BFSI to
maximize profits.
12
The FCIC found that the interconnectedness among the BFSI primarily
occurred in the securitization of mortgages and the insurance structure aimed at protecting
those securitized investments. FCIC, supra note 9, at xxv. For example, American Insurance
Group (AIG), formerly the nation’s largest insurer, provided insurance known as collateral
debt securities to cover the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) created from mortgages
that the BFSI purchased. Id. While the system was very convoluted because it lacked any
transparency, the value of the investments makes the picture more clear. Id. AIG held $79
billion in derivative exposure. Id. Citigroup considered $49 billion in highly-rated derivatives
a small deal. Merrill Lynch owned $55 billion in what it considered the safest level. FCIC,
supra note 9, at xxi. These institutions failed with collective liabilities of more than $183
billion with these figures. Id. Nevertheless, AIG and Merrill Lynch failed, and other
institutions subsequently acquired them. Id. Citigroup not only received initial TARP bailout
funds, but subsequently received additional taxpayer dollars because of its unstable
investments. Id.
13
See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2006 SERVICE ANNUAL SURVEY (Mar. 2008)
(finding the total revenue of companies engaged in securities, commodity contracts, and other
financial investment activities was $499.2 billion in 2006 as compared with $406.3 billion in
2005, representing an increase of 22.8% on a year-to-year basis). For the period spanning
from 2000 through 2006, the total revenue of these companies increased at a compound
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.4%. CAGR is not “the actual return in reality,” but an
“imaginary number that describes the rate at which an investment would have grown if it grew
at
a
steady
rate.”
Investopedia,
Compound
Annual
Growth
Rate,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cagr.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2013) (emphasis added).
These players—individuals and corporate entities—acquired historically unprecedented
profits and wealth building on speculation, which benefited a small elite group of executives
and investors.
14
The exotic mortgages securitized and sold on the secondary mortgage market
defaulted at unprecedented rates. David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The
New Regulatory Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 725 (2009); Mehrsa
Baradaran, Reconsidering the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
385, 387 (2012) [hereinafter Baradaran, Separation of Banking and Commerce] (stating banks
make increased profits when they take increased risk and have incentive to engage in risk-

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss1/5

4

Porter: Pawns for a Higher Greed

2014]

PAWNS FOR A HIGHER GREED

143

the financial crisis forced the government to use taxpayer dollars as a means
of last resort to bail out the BFSI’s losses to avoid an industry collapse, and
ultimately to prop up the national economy.16
In the pursuit of Mount Everest-size profits,17 the BFSI devastated
former homeowners, who lost their equity wealth and homes to foreclosure,
and existing homeowners (citizen homeowners), who lost equity wealth due
to property devaluation.18 In addition, all American taxpayers, whether
homeowners or not, had to pick up the tab to save banks and Wall Street

taking behavior due to explicit and implicit government support). Especially with banks
serving as the backup sources of liquidity for other financial institutions through credit
arrangements, other institutions’ outstanding debt obligations to banks impact bank
soundness, and, in some cases, liquidity when those debt obligations could not be paid. See
generally CORRIGAN, supra note 5. For example, Washington Mutual and IndyMac banks both
faced liquidity problems when they were unable to pay their debt obligations on the
commercial paper market, as well as their transaction deposits accounts (causing a run-on-thebank). Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/individual/failed/banklist.html; see Wendy Kaufman, Indymac Collapse Fuels Fears
About Wamu, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (July 27, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=92642046.
15
This is because banks and non-banks borrowed from each other to participate
in these transactions, so when one institution failed, the impact rippled through the entire
financial market. This effect created too-big-to-fail institutions. See generally CORRIGAN,
supra note 5, at 4.
16
Id. at 4. In periods of selective and generalized financial stress, such as the
financial shock of the 1970s and early 1980s, troubled financial and non-financial banks and
non-banks turned to the banking system to provide a bridge until more lasting solutions
worked out in order to prevent the problem from spreading to other institutions or to the
financial system generally. Id. The interconnectedness of bad investment practices and
management did not allow for this in 2007 when the financial crisis arose because too many in
the BFSI, especially when large banks, such as Washington Mutual, Countrywide, Wachovia,
and IndyMac, could not find stable, liquid bank sources due to the enormous debt obligations
they owed to other financial institutions. See generally Baradaran, Separation of Banking and
Commerce, supra note 14, at 407 (stating that because banks can only be owned by or merged
with other banks, they have become too large and too interconnected).
17
See
U.S.
Corporate
Profits
After
Tax,
YCHARTS,
http://ycharts.com/indicators/corporate_profits (last visited Nov. 6, 2013) [hereinafter
Corporate Profits After Tax] (showing statistics on profits during height of the predatory
lending period); see generally RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 176 (stating
bank reserves in 2012 were above $1.5 trillion). Cf. KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A.
MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 5
(2011) (stating that, between 2000 and 2007, the market generated more than $2.1 trillion in
just subprime mortgage-backed securities).
18
America’s
Lost
Trillions,
CNNMONEY,
June
9,
2011,
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/09/news/economy/household_wealth/index.htm; Weathering
the Great Recession: Did High-Poverty Neighborhoods Fare Worse?, THE PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS (Oct. 2012), http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_urban_
neighborhoods_report.pdf; Wealth After the Great Depression: Who Lost, Who Recovered,
and Why?, RECESSION TRENDS, https://www.stanford.edu/group/recessiontrends/cgi-bin/web/
resources/research-project/wealth-after-great-recession-who-lost-who-recovered-and-why
(last visited Sept. 8, 2013).
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firms and to rebuild the economy.19 The government has recovered losses
from the BFSI for foreclosed-upon former homeowners.20 The government,
however, has not sought adequate restitution from the BFSI for current
homeowners who lost significant equity wealth.21 Congress, therefore, must
hold the BFSI accountable for its reckless and negligent conduct that resulted
in unprecedented, historic losses for the economy and citizen homeowners.22
Thus, because of the BFSI’s intricate link to the financial crisis, this article
proposes that the government seek a lump sum settlement from the BFSI on
behalf of citizen homeowners who cannot sell their homes to recapture their
equity, or who have been unable to access equity wealth by refinancing their
mortgages.23
To compensate citizen homeowners, the BFSI should then annually
pay into a fund managed by a government agency, not the BFSI as with other
settlements.24 Existing citizen homeowners can then apply for funds directly,
with minimum criteria, if they purchased their homes between 2000 and
19

See Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and Unusual Circumstances: The Federal
Reserve and the U.S. Financial Crisis, in LAW REFORM AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 269 (Kern
Alexander & Niamh Molongey eds., 2011) [hereinafter Johnson, Exigent and Unusual
Circumstances] (explaining that even with this most recent financial crisis, the size and
complexity of financial institutions remain the same with little regulation implemented to
address how banks need to change their business model to avoid future crisis, and financial
harm to Americans). There is great concern that, by injecting historically unparalleled
amounts of liquidity into the financial system, the Federal Reserve may have set a precedent
with respect to its willingness to intervene in future crises. Id.
20
See State Attorneys General Who Signed the Joint State-Federal Mortgage
Settlement by State, NAT’L MORTG. SETTLEMENT, http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.
com/states (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) [hereinafter NAT’L MORTG. SETTLEMENT]; see also
About the Mortgage Settlement, OFFICE OF MORTG. SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT,
https://www.mortgageoversight.com/about-the-mortgage-settlement/#settlement-documents
(last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (providing the settlement terms).
21
Despite government-sponsored or government-mandated programs and legal
settlements with the BFSI to assist former and current citizen homeowners, these programs
provided inadequate assistance. Timothy Cavanaugh, Bloomberg (News): Obama Shoulda
Made HAMP, HARP Bigger, REASON.COM (June 13, 2012, 7:04 PM), available at
http://reason.com/blog/2012/06/13/bloomberg-news-obama-shoulda-made-hamp-h (reporting
that the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable
Refinance Program (HARP) did not avert the projected number of foreclosures or allow for
sufficient refinance of homes underwater (meaning the value of the property was less than the
mortgage principal balance owed on the property)).
22
See CORRIGAN, supra note 5. Historically, troubled banks could turn to the
London market or other foreign markets for financial assistance, but the foreign markets were
not forthcoming with assistance for American banks during the 2007 financial crisis. See
generally TOO BIG TO FAIL (HBO Films 2011). The BFSI created and offered investments in
some of the most risky residential MBSs, creating a dire economic strain on the American and
global economies when those underlying mortgages defaulted in record numbers. Id.
23
FCIC, supra note 9, at 245.
24
NAT’L MORTG. SETTLEMENT, supra note 20; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Petter
Eavis, Wall Street Predicts $50 Billion Bill to Settle U.S. Mortgage Suits, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9,
2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/09/wall-street-predicts-50-billion-bill-to-settle-us-mortgage-suits/ (reporting that banks have also set aside large reserves to absorb the
litigation costs).
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2007 and lost equity, or currently owned their homes before 2000 but lost
and have not recaptured substantial equity wealth since the 2007 financial
crisis. The BFSI received bailout funds from taxpayer dollars without
applying for the funds and with no restrictions on the use of these funds,
which the BFSI employed to cover economic losses and to pay large
executive bonuses. Citizen homeowners should not be mandated to follow an
onerous application process to establish their equity wealth losses any more
than the BFSI was required to demonstrate losses to obtain bailout funds,
especially when the BFSI created a financial crisis that it could have
avoided.25
The 2007 financial crisis and subsequent recession stemmed from
the residential mortgage market crisis and the secondary residential mortgage
market implosion, which were the results of BFSI profitability initiatives
aimed at reshaping America’s homeownership policy.26 The U.S. Congress,
which vested federal regulators with enforcement authority over the BFSI,
should therefore require the BFSI to pay restitution for the harm it caused to
citizen homeowners.
Section II of this Article analyzes the historical context of the
government’s use of homeownership and how the BFSI influenced that
policy for its own economic gain. It looks at the legislative actions aimed at
promoting homeownership and economic stability that the BFSI eroded.
Section III of this Article identifies the ways in which the BFSI primarily
used consumers, politicians, regulators, and rating agencies to fuel the
primary and secondary residential mortgage markets with high-risk, nontraditional mortgage products27 that were contrary to safety and soundness
standards and practices. This section also analyzes how the BFSI used its
power as a lobby to influence politicians and regulators to create a selfregulatory industry that abused rather than protected consumers and rocked
the economic stability of the nation. This Article argues in Section IV that
the nexus between the BFSI’s reckless and negligent behavior and the toxic
mortgage products it introduced into the residential finance market caused
the financial crisis. It further argues why Congress should mandate
restitution to citizen homeowners who lost equity wealth, while the BFSI
25

FCIC, supra note 9, at xvii.
“Owning one’s home is . . . an empowering act, giving people a stake in society
and a sense of control over their lives. Put differently, homeownership strengthens the social
fabric.” Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 327 (1998) (emphasis
added).
27
See generally Tracie R. Porter, The Field Between Lions and Zebras . . .
Evening the Playing Field Between Lenders and Borrowers: Conflicts of Interest and Legal
Obligations in the Residential Mortgage Transaction, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 623, 623 (2012)
[hereinafter Porter, Conflicts of Interest]; see ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 17; see also
SHEILA BAIR, BULLS BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET AND
WALL STREET FROM ITSELF (Free Press 2012) (discussing statements of the former FDIC
Chairman making reference to these types of mortgages as non-traditional mortgages, or
NTMs).
26
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profited not only from the investments that caused the financial collapse but
also from taxpayer bailout funds. Finally, Section V sets forth a restitution
theory Congress could adopt based on existing federal laws, such as the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), in order to redress the harm caused
to citizen homeowners by the BFSI’s fraudulent and deceptive practices in
mortgage lending practices. It calls for Congress to require the BFSI to
bailout citizen homeowners who lost equity wealth, given the BFSI received
a bailout for its losses.28
In 2009, the six largest commercial and investment banks29 within
the financial sector constituted more than sixty percent of the gross domestic
product (GDP).30 By 2012, the United States’ national residential finance
market was valued at more than $11 trillion.31 For commercial banks, Wall
Street investment firms and their investors, the residential mortgage market
created the opportunity for lucrative returns, both for short-term and longterm profits.32 To accomplish such unprecedented returns, the BFSI used its
28
As a caveat, the author is not optimistic that lobbying efforts can be eliminated
or sufficiently counteracted to mandate regulation, particularly given the armada of resources
the banking industry has at its disposal compared to that of consumer advocate agencies or the
voices of private citizens. This article certainly recognizes that money and power create a
large stumbling-block to curbing bank influence in housing policy.
29
In 2007, the five biggest investment firms included: Bear Stearns, Goldman
Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. FCIC, supra note 9, at xix. Two
of the firms were acquired by commercial banks: Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase (through
government guaranteed acquisition) and Merrill Lynch by Bank of America. Lehman Brothers
went bankrupt in September 2008. See Patrice Hill, Lehman Brothers Files For Bankruptcy,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/15/lehmanfiles-for-bankruptcy/?page=all. By 2009, the six biggest entities now include banks JP Morgan
Chase, Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo, and the investment banks of Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley. See Bob Ivry et al., Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion
Undisclosed to Congress, BLOOMBERG MARKETS (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-inincome.html (stating that six banks and investment companies, including JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., Bank of America, Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc.,
and Morgan Stanley, accounted for sixty-three percent of the average daily debt to the Federal
Reserve Bank, among all publicly traded U.S. banks, money managers, and investmentservices firms.)
30
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 37. The GDP is the market
value of all officially recognized final goods and services produced within a country in a given
period of time. Id. GDP per capita is often considered an indicator of a country's standard of
living. See generally Gross Domestic Product, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Gross_domestic_product (last visited July 25, 2013).
31
David Reiss, Message in a Mortgage, supra note 3 (citing Market Data, FED.
HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=70 (last visited Oct. 6, 2013));
President Barack Obama, 2012 State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-stateunion-address); see FCIC, supra note 9, at xv.
32
The short-term profits result from the interest borrowers pay monthly on the
principal balance of mortgage loans and through other fees lenders charge borrowers when
lenders originate mortgage loans. The long-term profits come from income on securitized
mortgage loans sold initially to the secondary mortgage market and then repackaged as
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financial stronghold on the residential finance market to co-opt policymakers
and regulators in Congress.
For example, BFSI’s special interest groups lobbied federal
politicians and bank regulators in order to divert the political agenda and to
redirect the regulatory regime regarding homeownership by using its wealth
to influence promulgation of new legislation and regulatory oversight
decision-making.33 From 1998 to 2008, the BFSI’s federal lobbying
expenditures hovered between $2.7 billion and $3.4 billion,34 not including
the additional $1 billion in campaign contributions from private individuals
affiliated with the industry and political action committees used to fund
federal political campaigns.35 The result of the BFSI’s lobbying efforts was a
significant impact on governmental regulation of the residential mortgage
finance industry, including a lack of meaningful oversight and standardssetting to ensure stability in the primary and secondary residential mortgage
markets and, ultimately, the national economy.36
The behemoth amount of money spent on lobbying efforts ensured
that a self-regulatory regime would be the norm and that government
interference would be minimal or, in some cases, eliminated.37 Regulatory
agencies compromised with the BFSI, instead of taking enforcement actions.
For some agencies, the BFSI was the primary source of funding, thus,
allowing the industry to greatly influence the agency’s actions.38 The BFSI,
ultimately, became a self-regulating industry that agreed to comply with
safety and soundness practices and standards promulgated by its regulators
as a principle-based compliance program.39 These safety and soundness
mortgage-backed securities, also known as MBSs, or in the case of residential mortgages,
RMBS. See generally FCIC, supra note 9.
33
Issa, supra note 11, at 413–17; Reiss, Three Principles for Housing Policy,
supra note 4, at 41; see Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra, Three's Company: Wall Street, Capitol
Hill, and K Street, VOX, Aug. 11, 2011, http://www.voxeu.org/article/did-anti-regulationlobbying-fuel-subprime-crisis (stating that “the financial industry fought, and defeated,
measures that might have allowed for a timely regulatory response to some of the reckless
lending practices and the consequent rise in delinquencies and foreclosures that most think
played a pivotal role in igniting the crisis . . . . In fact, banks continued to lobby intensively
against tighter regulation and financial regulatory reform even as the industry struggled
financially and suffered from negative publicity regarding its role in the economic crisis.”)
34
FCIC, supra note 9, at xvii; RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at
37. From 1998 to 2008, financial institutions had spent an estimated $2.7 billion in lobbying
expenses at the federal level. Id.
35
FCIC, supra note 9, at xviii.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See BAIR, supra note 27. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is no longer
an agency in the federal government because of the collapse of thrift institutions following the
financial crisis. Id.
39
See Vincent DiLorenzo, Barriers to Market Discipline: A Comparative Study
of Mortgage Market Reforms (St. John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1969405, Dec. 7,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969405. Safety and soundness practices and
standards were premised on concern about the concentration of financial power and risks the
BFSI would engage in using depositor funds. See CORRIGAN, supra note 5, at 1, 7.
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standards were put into place to assure consumers of the financial stability of
financial institutions, as well as to provide public confidence in the financial
markets, despite the fact that the standards were not mandatory but merely
suggested best-lending practices.40
The public confidence about the financial soundness of the BFSI and
its prudent practices to control risk and management was supposed to serve
as a public safety net. The practices were mainly for banks that held
depository accounts and for financial service entities that engaged in banklike activities.41 From a self-regulatory perspective, the BFSI blatantly
disregarded safety and soundness standards and practices and, as a result,
eroded the public policy safety net.42 For example, the BFSI introduced nontraditional, high-risk mortgage products—often referred to as toxic
mortgages—into the primary residential finance market and then bundled
those mortgages into mortgage-backed securities on the secondary mortgage
market. The toxic nature of these mortgage products, destined for default,
caused a devastating ripple effect on both national and global investors who
bought these securities.43 In 2007, as result of the BFSI refusing to follow
safety and soundness standards that the industry itself was to police, the
American economy and citizen homeowners suffered the cataclysmic impact
of the BFSI’s high-risk investments. Even in 2013, citizen homeowners were
still in financial distress due to the economic instability the BFSI caused in
the residential housing market.44 The American dream of homeownership has
become a nightmare because Americans who bought homes during the
mortgage finance boom that spanned from 2000 to 2007 are arguably in far
worse financial shape than they would have been had they not bought a home
at all.45
For many Americans, owning a home is the American dream.46
Owning one’s home is an empowering act that gives middle-class citizens a
stake in society and a sense of control over their lives.47 This notion became
especially entrenched following the Great Depression of the 1930s when the
federal government used home construction as a means to strengthen the

40

DiLorenzo, supra note 39.
See CORRIGAN, supra note 5.
42
BAIR, supra note 27 (reporting that banking officials admitted to selfregulation, then admitted that the problem was “bad regulation”); see generally CORRIGAN,
supra note 5.
43
FCIC, supra note 9.
44
Id. at xviii.
45
Edward L. Glaeser, Rethinking the Federal Bias Toward Homeownership, 13
CITYSCAPE: J. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES. 5, 8 (2011), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/
periodicals/cityscpe/vol13num2/Cityscape_July2011_rethinking.pdf.
46
Reiss, Three Principles for Housing Policy, supra note 4, at 41 (comparing the
“yeoman farmer,” who was the “ideal citizen because he was self-sufficient, earn[ing] his own
keep . . .[, guarding] his liberty and unalienable rights,” to the 20th century “homeowner”).
47
Williams, supra note 26, at 327.
41
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national economy and homeownership to rebuild a strong social fabric.48 The
political belief of the time was that homeownership and stable housing were
fundamental ideologies ingrained in American citizenship.49 When the
federal government developed homeownership policy in the early 1930s, it
sought to provide citizens with a foundation for stability through
homeownership and, ultimately, to create better citizens.50 Nearly every
president since the 1930s has supported homeownership51 because
homeownership has generally been seen as good for the national economy.
Homeownership spurs construction, which creates jobs and aids in economic
recovery through spending. It also establishes communities of citizens and
allows citizens to participate in equity wealth building.52 The historical
48
This privilege of home ownership was previously accessible only to the wellto-do and wealthiest Americans in the early 19th century. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2192–93 (2007). Citizen homeowners built
their homeownership dream on the premise that owning their home was like owning a piece of
America, a wealthy country with vast resources. See generally Reiss, Three Principles for
Housing Policy, supra note 4, at 42.
49
See Reiss, Three Principles for Housing Policy, supra note 4, at 42 (discussing
the ethics of federal homeownership policy and referring to the “Housing as a Bulwark of
Democracy” ethic in which politicians approach the notion of federal housing policy).
50
Id. at 42 (referring to visions of the federal housing policy as based on caveat
emptor or based on a vision of housing as a foundation for a stable life for homeowners and
their families); Carliner, supra note 6, at 301, 315 (stating that homeownership builds
character and citing that the goal of the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act
of 1990 was “that every American family be able to afford a decent home in a suitable living
environment”).
51
Carliner, supra note 6, at 301 (asserting that homeowners are more likely to be
voters while non-homeowners are not, thus promotion of homeownership is always a
favorable political tactic). Prior to the 1930s, state law regulated residential mortgage lending
without federal government intervention except with regard to land trusts. Id.
52
This premise is generally true given the extraordinary support of past
presidents. President Franklin D. Roosevelt created federal homeownership policy through the
creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and government-sponsored entitites
(GSEs). See generally Vincent J. Cannato, A Home of One's Own, 3 NAT’L AFFAIRS 69
(2010), available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20100317_Cannato.pdf. As part of
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s war on poverty, he created and established the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). See generally Department of Housing and Urban
Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3532–37 (2012). See also Questions and Answers about
HUD, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/about/qaintro) (last visited Nov.
6, 2013). At the request of President William “Bill” Clinton, HUD worked with dozens of
national politicians and the housing industry to implement the National Homeownership
Strategy, also referred to as the HOPE Program. See generally DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN
DEV., URBAN POLICY BRIEF NUMBER 2 (Aug. 1995), http://www.huduser.org/
publications/txt/hdbrf2.txt. President George W. Bush built on Clinton’s goal for increasing
homeownership by setting a new goal to create 5.5 million new minority homeowners by the
end of the decade in 2010, referred to as the Minority Homeownership Plan. See Michael
Lawson & Kat Aaron, Promoting Homeownership Through the Years, INVESTIGATIVE
REPORTING WORKSHOP, July 21, 2011, http://americawhatwentwrong.org/story/promotinghome-ownership/ (stating that the Bush administration’s “ownership society” framed
homeownership as an engine to help eliminate persistent racial inequalities). In response to the
mortgage crisis that resulted from the 2007 financial crisis, President Barack Obama created a
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perspective of homeownership held true for many citizens during the housing
boom between 2000 and 2007. Citizens who otherwise would not have been
able to become homeowners lived the American dream because the BFSI
deceptively enticed them as borrowers into unstable mortgage products.
These unstable mortgage products then ultimately caused them to lose their
homes, their wealth accumulation, and the sense of control over their lives.
The good that government homeownership policy sought to create was
devastated by the greed of the BFSI.53 Armed with the money and control,
the BFSI gradually converted homeownership policy to its own end in the
name of profit.54
Historically, lenders have taken advantage of government policy to
ensure profits and liquidity in the residential mortgage market. With the
creation of Federal Housing Administration (FHA)55 standard mortgages in
1934, government policy sought to provide liquidity in the residential
mortgage markets. Subsequently, government-sponsored entities (GSEs)
would aid lenders by allowing them to sell mortgages they held on a
secondary market to purchasers in exchange for cash in order to free up
comprehensive plan to stabilize the U.S. housing market by helping homeowners get
mortgage relief and avoid foreclosure. See generally About MHA, THE MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE
PROGRAM
(MHA),
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/about-mha/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
53
For many lending institutions, especially local savings and loan associations,
the depository accounts used to lend money for mortgages stayed in the community where
homeowners lived and worked. In the post-depression era of the late 1930s, this concept of
local lending changed and lenders on a national level sought to enter the mortgage lending
market. See Peterson, supra note 48, at 2191–92.
54
While many scholars and experts point to government deregulation, nonenforcement of existing regulations, minority and low-income borrowers, or anyone other than
banks and Wall Street, the reality exists that banks have been self-regulating in regard to
mortgage lending for many decades. See DiLorenzo, supra note 39; see also Peterson, supra
note 48, at 2185. See generally Raymond H. Brescia & Sonia Steinway, Scoring the Banks:
Building A Behaviorally Informed Community Impact Report Card for Financial Institutions,
18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. REV. 339, 339 (2013); Jack T. Gannon, Jr., Let’s Help the
Credit Rating Agencies Get It Right: A Simple Way to Alleviate A Flawed Industry Model, 31
REV. BANKING & FIN. L.J. 1015, 1015 (2012); Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main
Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 5 (2009). Cf.
Schmudde, supra note 14.
55
The FHA was created by the National Housing Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 73479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701–50 (2012)). See also
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/fhahistory (last visited
July 25, 2013). The FHA became a part of HUD’s Office of Housing in 1965. Id.
President Roosevelt created the FHA as a part of many New Deal programs
following the 1938 Depression. Id. In an era where the housing market needed a boost, the
FHA created an opportunity for lenders to make safe loans guaranteed by the government and
for more Americans to be able to attain affordable loans. Id. The mission of the FHA was to
strengthen the social fabric through creating homeowners who would be invested in
improving the economic condition of the society. See Peterson, supra note 48; see David
Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's
Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1022–23 (2008).
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funds for future lending. Lenders then could make new mortgages with
money they received from these secondary market transactions, in addition to
making short-term profits.56 The objective of using the FHA to set affordable
loan standards was to ensure the quality, in terms of soundness and safety, of
the mortgages that GSEs purchased.57 The secondary mortgage market made
sensible government policy because the FHA already guaranteed the
mortgages, and the FHA standard mortgages that GSEs acquired on the
secondary market were those mortgages that the FHA had already deemed
safe for borrowers.58 GSEs then bundled these mortgages into securities,
commonly known as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) or residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), and sold them to investors to raise
revenues. The secondary market promised lenders a guaranteed return on
FHA mortgage investments. With no secondary market for other more
profitable, non-FHA (or conventional) mortgages, the BFSI began to put
pressure on the government to allow GSEs to acquire less stable and less safe
mortgage products.59 With increasing BFSI pressure on policymakers and the
conversion of GSEs to privately-owned,60 but still government-sponsored
and guaranteed entities, lenders benefitted from selling GSEs riskier
mortgages that yielded the BFSI more profitable returns.61 Seizing the
opportunity to increase their profits as well, private financial investment
firms purchased conventional loans that they bundled as private-label
securities and then sold to national and global investors.62 These private-label
MBSs would comprise the riskiest—but most profitable—investments for
investors. These investors, including banks and other investment firms, using
sophisticated vehicles such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that
were insured by credit default swaps (CDSs), ultimately would account for
the financial crisis and mortgage collapse of 2007.63 Through such greed, the
56
The profits were from the interest and fees that lenders collected at the closing
of mortgage loans, in addition to the premium that lenders then received from selling the
mortgages to GSEs or investment firms on the secondary mortgage market. See generally
Peterson, supra note 48. See also FHA, supra note 55.
57
FCIC, supra note 9, at xxvi. The BFSI was intent on serving the national and
international financial markets with new and more profitable products. See Joseph William
Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and
How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
58
Peterson, supra note 48.
59
See andré douglas pond cummings, Racial Coding and the Financial Market
Crisis, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 141, 174–88 (2011).
60
The increasing government liability for GSEs caused the government to rethink
how to minimize its liability due to the rapid growth of the secondary market. Id. Thus, the
government privatized the GSEs but still guaranteed the entities to assure confidence from
investors who sold and bought mortgages on the secondary market. S. REP. NO. 90-1123, at
1871–76 (1968), available at https://bulk.resource.org/gao.gov/90-448/000051A1.pdf.
61
pond cummings, supra note 59.
62
Id.
63
See Kristin N. Johnson, From Diagnosing the Dilemma to Divining a Cure:
Post-Crisis Regulation of Financial Markets, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1299, 1306–07 (2010)
[hereinafter Johnson, Post-Crisis Regulation of Financial Markets].
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BFSI had seized homeownership policy and manipulated the foundation of
the American dream for its own purposes.
In essence, the BFSI claimed control of American homeownership
policy and, in the process, stripped away the stability of homeownership
offered to Americans through the BFSI’s risky gambling in the quest for
profits. As of 2013, residential mortgage lending is stagnant, although
lenders possess substantial capital to invest.64 As a result of the 2007
financial collapse, housing prices in many areas of the country remain
significantly devalued, holding existing citizen homeowners hostage because
they are unable to sell homes with a lender-assisted short sale or are unable
to refinance their mortgages despite the government’s push for lenders to
cooperate in loan restructuring.65 For citizen homeowners whose mortgages
are upside-down, meaning the value of the property is less than the
remaining balance on the loan, any previously accumulated equity wealth has
been lost. Before the 2007 financial crisis and the predatory loan era of 2004
to 2007, citizen homeowners had accumulated wealth through equity in their
homes. Homeowners relied on such equity to fund future life events, such as
retirement, education, emergencies, and other essential needs. Many existing
citizen homeowners are still suffering from a substantial loss of equity in
their homes, resulting in the inability to pay for life events using accumulated
equity wealth. The loss is devastating for a substantial amount of citizen
homeowners. In January 2012, the White House reported more than $7
trillion in lost home equity wealth resulting from the 2007 residential finance
market crisis,66 while the BFSI captured more than $11 trillion of the market
value. This disparity makes it painstakingly clear that homeownership policy
no longer provides citizen homeowners with a sense of empowerment,
control, or inclusion in the social fabric of this nation.
II. FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION TO THE GREAT
RECESSION
The creation of government policies related to homeownership stems
from the demand for adequate housing after the Great Depression. Due to
this demand, the need for government intervention seemed reasonable to
ensure citizens had access to mortgage products that otherwise would not be
64
See generally Tracie R. Porter, Managing Settlements for Consumers of the
Mortgage and Foreclosure Crises, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 301, 301 (2012) [hereinafter Porter,
Managing Settlements]. In 2011, banks were financially well-endowed, so much so that five
major financial institutions voluntarily agreed to settle a $25 billion settlement with federal
and state attorneys general related to the foreclosure crisis and robo-signing. Federal
Government and Attorneys General Reach Landmark Settlement with Major Banks, NAT’L
MORTG. SETTLEMENT, http://nationalmortgagesettlement.com/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
65
See Cavanaugh, supra note 21.
66
Obama, supra note 31; see Corporate Profits After Tax, supra note 17
(providing statistics on profits lenders made from 2000 to 2008, the time of greatest predatory
lending leading up to the recession).
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available. But in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the demand for housing was
on a decline because housing starts were down and property price
appreciation was slow.67 Lenders with a huge pot of money, therefore,
created a demand for housing and mortgages.68 These lenders targeted new
pools of borrowers who did not otherwise qualify for a mortgage, or these
lenders also made it simple to gain access to mortgages. At least thirty
percent of the mortgages in 2006 came from high-risk borrowers for whom
lenders created high-risk mortgage products, such as subprime loans and altA mortgages,69 in addition to already riskier, existing FHA loans.70 Thus, in a
market in which there was low (or no) demand and in which lenders had
money to lend at favorable rates and terms, the campaign for homeownership
spread nationwide. Most importantly, it appears from the demand that
lenders facilitated the activity, with government cooperation, for their own
gain and not due to consumers’ demand for non-traditional mortgage loans,
including subprime mortgages acquired through predatory lending practices.
For example, Countrywide Bank, once the nation’s largest mortgage
lender, but now owned by Bank of America, created the demand for nontraditional mortgages, or toxic mortgages. This demand would not have
existed but for Countrywide purposefully creating and introducing these
mortgages into the market. To market these toxic mortgages, Countrywide
engaged mortgage brokers as paid, covert agents in its lending scheme. So,
although several scholars have labeled mortgage brokers as the primary
perpetrators of lending abuses,71 Countrywide was, in fact, the main supplier
67
John A. Tatom, The U.S. Foreclosure Crisis: A Two-Pronged Assault on the
U.S. Economy 4–5 (Networks Fin. Inst. Working Paper No. 2008-WP-10), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1194975.
68
Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 27.
69
Tatom, supra note 67, at 4. Lenders created subprime loans for borrowers with
relatively low credit scores and alt-A loans, also referred to as “no or low doc” loans for
borrowers with prime credit scores. Id. Historically, these non-traditional sources of mortgage
credit and these riskier products and categories of borrowers were unprecedented, and lenders
ignored their performance success long-term. Id. at 5.
70
Id. at 4.
71
See Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/business/yourmoney/26country.html; see
also Zachary B. Marquand, Ability to Repay: Mortgage Lending Standards After Dodd-Frank,
15 N.C. BANKING INST. 291, 291 (2011) (“Lenders pay brokers a percentage of the loan
originated and an additional percentage for including high profit or risky features . . . . Brokers
can increase their income by originating more loans, larger loans, and loans with riskier
features . . . . A revenue maximizing broker would attempt to include as many high risk
features as possible in the largest loan a borrower can afford and make as many of these loans
as possible.”); Kale Gans, Anatomy of A Mortgage Meltdown: The Story of the Subprime
Crisis, the Role of Fraud, and the Efficacy of the Idaho Safe Act, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 123, 125
(2011) (providing statistics that show that mortgage brokers and borrowers—but not bank
employees—committed virtually all the mortgage fraud that precipitated the crisis); Charles
W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: What
Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV.
1243, 1324 (2011) (stating that numerous factors coalesced to lead to the meltdown, including
borrowers, mortgage brokers, and mortgage lenders combining to create unsound mortgages
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of these toxic mortgages in the residential market. In order to sell them for
large profits to the secondary mortgage securities market, Countrywide
established a subsidiary, Countrywide Home Loans, specifically to originate
toxic mortgages, known as subprime and alt-A mortgages. This was done
solely to incentivize mortgage brokers to originate these mortgages.72 In so
doing, the residential market became flooded with mortgages destined for
default.73
A. Pre-Depression Lending Standards—The “Safe Loan” Era74
Prior to the Great Depression, banks originated and held mortgages
locally. As a result, banks carefully assessed the risk of default on loans and
offered products congruent with that risk.75 In the two-party lending
relationship between lenders and borrowers, lenders responsibly made loans
because they held and served their own loans. Defaults on loans meant direct
losses for the banks. Lenders, therefore, built relationships with borrowers.
By dealing directly with borrowers, lenders were in the best position to
assess the risk of doing business with them. Banks implemented lending
standards consummate with their risk-adverseness. For instance, lending
standards were conservative, such as requiring large down payments of forty
that were candidates for default, liars’ loans, and “affordable” 2/28 mortgages with
“manufactured” teaser rates); Ben Steverman & David Bogoslaw, The Financial Crisis Blame
Game, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Oct. 18, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/200810-18/the-financial-crisis-blame-gamebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-andfinancial-advice (offering a condensed version of the blame game; as markets crash and
retirement dreams fade away, the media and the public are full of outrage at everyone from
mortgage brokers and Wall Street CEOs to real estate investors to experts who failed to
predict the crisis was coming).
72
A body of scholarship adequately addresses the role of mortgage brokers in
causing the financial crisis and their involvement with mortgage lending. See generally
Cassandra Jones Havard, “Goin’ Round in Circles” . . . And Letting Bad Loans Win: When
Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L.
REV. 737, 775–76 (2008). This article, therefore, does not address mortgage brokers as
“pawns.”
73
Tatom, supra note 67, at 12; see also FCIC, supra note 9, at 20 (discussing the
poor quality of loans, “which had the great likelihood of going sour”); RAMIREZ, LAWLESS
CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 78 (stating that “[m]any subprime loans appear intended for
default.”).
74
“Safe Loans” is a reference to loans that banks felt were sound, especially
when banks originated and kept loans in their own portfolios. See FCIC, supra note 9, at 7.
Once banks began selling loans on the secondary market and taking them off their books and
balance sheets, they cared less about loan quality, such as long-term performance and stability
based on the borrowers’ ability to pay and the historic performance of the mortgage product,
but instead, banks focused more on short-term profits from selling the loans. Id. at 44.
75
pond cummings, supra note 59, at 34 nn.159–60; Peterson, supra note 48, at
2192. During this period, banks were local. National banks did not invest in the local
residential mortgage market. Commercial lenders did not make mortgage loans in the early
twentieth century because of the risk associated with such credit extensions and the lack of
liquidity that banks face making such loans. Id.
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percent of the purchase price, limiting loan maturity terms to three and six
years with balloon payments for the balance at the end of the term, and
lending only to borrowers that demonstrated the ability to repay the loan.76 In
other words, lenders made “safe loans,” 77 meaning loans with a low risk of
default, assured profits for lenders, and heightened accountability to repay
for borrowers who made such large initial equity investments. Unfortunately,
such terms meant that wealthy citizens who had the financial means to
borrow money benefited. Even with such safe loan practices in the
residential mortgage market banks still suffered losses when borrowers, who
also played the speculative stock market, defaulted. Following the crash, the
government’s response was, in part, an effort to revive the national economy
by stimulating construction in the residential housing market. Lenders at both
local and national levels were instrumental to the government’s initiatives.78
B. Post-Depression Residential Market Rescue
Banks’ lending practices transformed when the two-party lending
relationship between lenders79 and consumers evolved into a three-party
relationship among lenders,80 consumers, and the federal government.81 The
three-party mortgage lending transaction eroded the “safe loan” model82 by
shifting risk previously held by banks to the government.83 As a result of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal to rescue the economy after the
Great Depression, the government guaranteed residential mortgage loans and
created a secondary mortgage market. The government guarantee on
76

Peterson, supra note 48, at 2192.
The term “safe loans” is used by the author in the context of this article only.
See FCIC, supra note 9, at 7.
78
Local lenders dominated the residential finance market until after World War
II. See Matthew Chambers et al., Did Housing Policies Cause the Postwar Boom in
Homeownership? 1, 5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper Series, Apr. 2012).
However, under President Roosevelt’s New Deal Plan, national commercial banks would play
a major role in financing residential construction, especially with government guarantees. See
generally id. at 5. Prior to the 1930s, the federal government was only involved in residential
housing as related to land trusts, but now became involved in residential housing and
financing. Id.; see also Carliner, supra note 6, at 300.
79
Lenders in the two-party relationship refers to those identified in the late 19th
century, such as building and loans (also known as U.S. building societies, savings and loans,
or thrifts), mutual savings banks, private lending firms, and some insurance companies.
Peterson, supra note 48, at 2192.
80
In the three-party relationship, the term lender includes commercial banks that
were unwilling to lend in the mortgage market in the early 19th century, but became involved
after the government began assuring repayment of FHA mortgage loans. Id. at 2192.
81
Id. at 2191–99.
82
“Safe loans” were primarily safe for lending because of the low risk of defaults
by mortgages. See generally FCIC, supra note 9, at 7; see also Wenli Li & Michelle J. White,
Mortgage Default, Foreclosures and Bankruptcy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper
No. 15472 Nov. 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15472.
83
In the three-party relationship, the government is the guarantor of the
mortgage, placing very little risk on lenders. Peterson, supra note 48, at 2195.
77
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mortgage loans aimed to alleviate banks’ fears of risk related to property
devaluation and borrower default. The government designed the secondary
mortgage market for residential mortgages with the government’s guarantee
to resolve lenders’ fears of losses due to devaluation and borrowers’ defaults
and to provide a solution to the liquidity problems due to significant losses
from the previous downturn in the residential housing market.84
To carry out its mission, the government established the Home
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA), and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).85 The
government created each entity to address the reluctance of local lenders to
reenter the mortgage market after the Great Depression and to provide the
capital necessary to aid in rebuilding communities and the economy. The
newly created agencies aimed to establish a stable mortgage-lending
infrastructure, encourage local lenders to get back into the residential lending
business, and attract national commercial lenders that had not previously
participated in the residential finance market.86 The government guarantee
created a three-party lending relationship that shifted risk away from lenders,
and lenders were quick to partake in the potential new profits. Looking at
each entity and its purpose helps understand how lenders exploited the
government’s policies for using homeownership to rebuild the economy for
its citizens during the New Deal era and beyond.87
First, Congress created the HOLC,88 in 1933, with the sole purpose
to buy mortgages owned by financially distressed borrowers.89 After the
government bought distressed mortgages90 from lenders with taxpayer
money, HOLC then refinanced borrowers’ mortgages with terms that made
the monthly payments more affordable and eliminated balloon payments.91
For example, the government extended the original three-to-six-year
84

Id. at 2194–97.
Id. at 2195.
86
Id.
87
See Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal, 62
MD. L. REV. 515, 560 (2003) [hereinafter Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics].
88
Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (2012).
89
Peterson, supra note 48, at 2195 n.46; see Ramirez, The Law and
Macroeconomics, supra note 87, at 560; see Roberson v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 147
S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); see also Annotation, Home Owner’s Loan Act, 125 A.L.R.
809 (1940) (“The Home Owners Loan Act was created for the purpose of supplying direct
relief to home owners, with respect to home mortgage indebtedness, to refinance home
mortgages, to extend relief to owners of homes occupied by them, who are unable to amortize
their debts elsewhere, and to pay, within limits, any accrued taxes, assessments, necessary
maintenance, repairs and incidental costs.”).
90
“Distressed mortgages” in this era were mortgages in which borrowers’ would
default on repayment because of inability to pay the monthly payment or the principal balance
upon maturity, especially for those borrowers who lost their wealth during the stock market
crash and subsequent Great Depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s. See generally
Peterson, supra note 48, at 2191–93.
91
Carliner, supra note 6, at 304. HOLC refinanced twenty percent of residential
mortgages. Id.
85
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repayment terms to up to thirty years. The longer repayment term meant the
monthly payments were lower, making mortgages more affordable for
financially distressed homeowners.92 As a result of HOLC refinancing an
estimated one million mortgages, constituting approximately ten percent of
the outstanding residential mortgages at the time,93 borrower default rates
declined. This meant that borrowers who made substantial deposits of equity
when they purchased their homes were able to keep their homes and any
accumulated equity wealth. It also meant that communities could rebound
because families could stay in their homes. Additionally, it meant that
lenders were freed from distressed or potentially distressed mortgages and
enjoyed liquidity to make other investments.
Nevertheless, having suffered significant losses from the collapse of
the economy and being skeptical of unstable property values in the
residential market, lenders still refused to make mortgage loans, especially
under terms borrowers could afford. By refusing to lend in the residential
market, the liquidity for mortgages dried up. Driven by profit motivation,
lenders needed additional incentives to make mortgage loans, and until they
got one, they held the residential mortgage market hostage.
As a result, in 1934, Congress created the FHA94 to complement the
mission of HOLC. While HOLC had addressed the problem with existing
distressed mortgages, the FHA addressed the lack of lender confidence in the
residential market. The FHA’s mission was to offer government-guaranteed
repayment to lenders who made residential mortgage loans under FHAestablished standards.95 The quid pro quo between the government and
lenders was that lenders had to offer more favorable loan terms to borrowers
than they had in the past. For instance, the FHA set terms similar to those
offered by HOLC, such as longer repayment terms of up to twenty or thirty
years without balloon payments and lower down payments of between ten
and twenty percent.96 For lenders who agreed to make mortgage loans using
FHA standards, the government agreed to pay lenders for the loss suffered if

92

See generally id. at 300.
Peterson, supra note 48, at 2195 n.46 (citing Kenneth T. Jackson, Race,
Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal
Housing Administration, 6 J. URB. HIST. 419, 421 (1980)) (discussing the adverse role race
played in the refinancing of loans in minority communities).
94
The 1934 National Housing Act authorized the FHA insurance program.
Carliner, supra note 6, at 305.
95
Peterson, supra note 48, at 2195. The Veterans Administration (VA)
functioned similar to FHA in that the VA guaranteed mortgages lenders made to veterans after
World War II. Id. at 2197. The government provided insurance to lenders so that, in the event
of default, lenders did not suffer any loss of the outstanding loan balance. Id.
96
Peterson, supra note 48, at 2195 n.47; see Ramirez, The Law and
Macroeconomics, supra note 86, at 560; see also Quinton Johnson, Private Mortgage
Insurance, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 785 (2004). In the 1940s, twenty-year mortgages
were common. Chambers, supra note 78, at 5. Eventually, in the 1960s, thirty-year mortgages
became familiar to modern borrowers. See id.
93
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the loan defaulted.97 The loss suffered was measured by the difference
between the price the property sold for at foreclosure and the outstanding
mortgage balance. Lenders ultimately recouped the full value of their
outstanding mortgages for any defaults under an FHA-standard mortgage.
Such governmental risk absorption was necessary because lenders refused to
reenter the residential mortgage market. Only with the risk shifted did
lenders agree to reenter the market because of the profit potential.98 Not only
did lenders that invested in mortgage loans prior to the Great Depression take
advantage of the government’s new housing policy, but also lenders that had
previously refused to participate in the residential mortgage market saw an
opportunity to make unprecedented profits. Lenders took advantage of the
government guarantees; and, without constant cash flow concerns and the
risk of loans sitting on their books, they could reap windfall profits and
greater liquidity through the secondary mortgage market provided through
Fannie Mae.
In 1938, Congress created Fannie Mae,99 the third and last prong of
the New Deal housing policies aimed at establishing viable residential
mortgage lending infrastructure. Fannie Mae solved the cash flow problem
for lenders that had historically held on to the mortgages they originated by
creating a secondary market to purchase residential FHA-standard
mortgages. At its inception as a government-owned entity, Fannie Mae acted
as an assignee for FHA. Fannie Mae only purchased FHA-standard
mortgages from lenders, for which it paid lenders a premium.100 Lenders
were guaranteed profits by either keeping the government-guaranteed FHAstandard mortgages on their books (thereby earning profits from the
repayments) or assigning the FHA-standard mortgages to Fannie Mae for
cash (thereby receiving the full value of the outstanding loan plus a
premium). For the first option, keeping the loans on the lender’s books meant
some risk for the lender if the loan defaulted because the lender still had to
initiate foreclosure to recover the government guarantee. This option also
meant that the lender’s available cash to make additional loans was limited.
97
Peterson, supra note 48, at 2195 n.48. The government paid banks the
difference between the amount of the loan collected from a foreclosure sale and the
outstanding loan balance. See id. For example, a property valued at $100,000 with a $20,000
down payment of equity was subject to an $80,000 mortgage loan. If the borrower defaulted
on the mortgage with a balance of $75,000 at the time of the default, a lender who could only
get $70,000 for the property at a foreclosure sale sought $5,000 from the government. In the
event the property sold for more than $75,000 at the foreclosure sale, the borrower owed
nothing to the lender or received any excess above the amount to pay off the mortgage, and
the government owed nothing to the lender. In either case, the lenders received the full value
of their mortgage from the government or from the proceeds from the sale of the property at a
foreclosure sale. Id.
98
Id. While lenders recouped the money from the mortgage whether or not the
loan defaulted, the government gave borrowers no assurances against risk for loss of any
equity they invested in the property if realty market prices declined. Id.
99
Id. at 2196.
100
See generally Peterson, supra note 48, at 2196 n.53.
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The latter option was optimal for lenders because, by selling the loans to the
FHA, lenders eliminated their risk of default and did not have to initiate
foreclosure actions to collect any outstanding balances. This option also
freed up lender cash flow to make additional FHA-standard loans, which
then led to guaranteed short-term profits from selling their FHA loans, and
the ability to make other more profitable investments.
The government policies enacted through the FHA and Fannie Mae
gradually stimulated the mortgage market, and the overall economy, as
intended. Eventually though, lenders saw the potential for unlimited and riskfree premiums through the sale of loans to the FHA. Thus, lenders used the
third-party transaction among lenders, borrowers, and the government as a
means for profit generation to the detriment of the government, borrowers,
and the economy. Entrenched in the infrastructure of the growing residential
market, government involvement grew but not solely of its own initiative.
The government-owned and government-managed Fannie Mae fell into the
hands of private investors in 1968 through the passage of new legislation,
known as the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (the HUD
Act).101 The HUD Act created a means for lenders to expand their advantage
in the residential secondary mortgage market through three GSEs, all of
which came with the full faith and credit of the government. Private investors
who ultimately took control over the GSEs and the secondary residential
mortgage market, however, deviated from purchasing safer FHA-standard,
government-guaranteed mortgages and began introducing riskier, non-FHA
mortgages into the secondary market. Arguably, these risky mortgages
ultimately led to the demise of the secondary market and that of the national
economy as well.
C. Unraveling of the Mortgage Lending Market—The Secondary
Mortgage Markets Under Self-Correcting Market Regime
Subsequent to the government’s implementation of policies to
support the residential finance market, mortgage lending on both the primary
and secondary markets remained stable.102 Despite the Savings and Loan
Crisis in the 1980s, the impact on citizen homeowners was marginal.103
101

The HUD Act created the private GSE commonly known as Fannie Mae. See
Carliner, supra note 6, at 308–09. The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie
Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) resulted from the passage
of the HUD Act, respectively with other functions for the secondary market for government
guaranteed FHA and VA mortgages and private-label securities issued by banks and financial
services institutions. Id. at 309.
102
See generally Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure As a Crisis in the
Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 369, 369 (2009).
103
Moran, supra note 54, at 13, 19 (“The roots of the credit crisis stretch back to
another notable boom-and-bust in recent history: the tech bubble of the late 1990s.”).
Homeownership rose to 67.4% of U.S. households in 2000 from 64% by 1994. See U.S.
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Beginning in the early 1990s, however, lenders in the mortgage market
started to engage in risky behavior in their lending practices with borrowers,
as well as with regard to the types of mortgage products they introduced into
the residential market. Banks and non-banks (i.e., financial services firms)
raised their investment risk by the increasing amount of MBSs in their asset
pools.104 In the early 2000s, lenders began using RMBSs as an essential tool
for boosting profit revenues from domestic and global investors and bundled
new, risky mortgage products into MBSs.105 Because of these products,
lenders fueled the primary—and ultimately the secondary—mortgage
markets with unstable products that were instrumental in causing the
financial crisis of 2007.106 In addition to supplying the secondary mortgage
market with these risky mortgage products, lenders engaged in deceptive and
predatory lending practices to lure borrowers—who otherwise had not met
established underwriting standards—into homeownership.107
As early as 1994, abusive lending practices were on the rise because
lenders began introducing risky mortgage products that ultimately proved to
be unstable due to borrowers’ inability to make mortgage payments.108
Lenders also engaged in predatory lending by selling very sophisticated and
complex mortgage products to less sophisticated borrowers.109 In response to
CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS ON RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND
HOMEOWNERSHIP (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr307/
q307press.pdf.
104
Baradaran, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 14, at 420 (citing
Andrew G. Haldane & Piergiorgio Alessandri, BANKING ON THE STATE 2–4 (2009),
http://www.bis.org/review/r091111e.pdf).
105
Id.
106
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 128–29; FCIC, supra note 9,
at xvii; Moran, supra note 54, at 13; Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Statement on Comprehensive Approach to Market Developments (Sept. 19, 2008), available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1149.htm (“As we all know, lax lending practices
earlier this decade led to irresponsible lending and irresponsible borrowing. This simply put
too many families into mortgages they could not afford.”).
107
FCIC, supra note 9, at xxii; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 17, at 28.
108
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 17, at 28–29.
109
Id. at 30; Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory
Lenders Use Minorities to Target Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
165, 168 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity] (noting that lenders
purposefully target consumers to influence their decision-making). The education level of the
borrower does not denote the level of sophistication because both well-educated and lesseducated borrowers took out risky mortgages without fully understanding the nature of the
investment or the ultimate havoc the mass introduction of these mortgage products into the
market would wreak on the national economy or on new and well-established citizen
homeowners. John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair Housing
Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 629, 634–35 (2008) (describing an increase in the subprime market and a
corresponding increase in abusive lending practices); Charles L. Nier, III, & Maureen R. St.
Cyr, A Racial Financial Crisis: Rethinking the Theory of Reverse Redlining to Combat
Predatory Lending Under the Fair Housing Act, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 941, 946 (2011) (“With
the growth in subprime lending during the 1990s and early 2000s, predatory lending abuses
also increased. Although subprime lending has come to a standstill in the wake of the financial
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the urging of consumer advocates, Congress passed the Homeownership and
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA),110 giving the Federal Reserve Board (FRB)
authority to issue new mortgage lending standards and to investigate lenders’
abusive lending practices, including seeking remedies for violations of any
government regulations or standards as the FRB deemed necessary.111
Nevertheless, the BFSI’s influence over regulators and policymakers,
through lobbying and other monetary means, stifled the FRB’s enforcement
of HOEPA. In addition, under Alan Greenspan’s regime as the FRB
Chairman from 1987 to 2006,112 the long-standing policy was that any
changes in mortgage lending practices would result from self-correction in
the market, not from government regulation.113 Self-correction by the market
was the FRB’s governing framework, even though the FRB issued the
standards for safety and soundness practices for the financial industry. As
evidenced by their conduct, lenders failed to comply with such safety and
soundness standards to keep the market stable and, residually, to protect
consumers. A self-correction scheme was insufficient to dissuade the BFSI
from extracting excess profits from the market, especially when the industry
could borrow money from the FRB so cheaply and invest it with greater
returns in the secondary mortgage market.114
By 2004, lenders not only ramped up their bad lending practices, but
they also introduced toxic financial products into the market, such as
derivative products that came with both high-risks to borrowers and
investors, and high profit margins for the financial institutions that marketed
them.115 These highly risky investment vehicles were an integral part of the

crisis, the harm from predatory subprime practices continues, most obviously in the form of
foreclosure actions.”).
110
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 184
Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693s (2012)).
111
15 U.S.C. § 1639(l) (2012). “The Board may, by regulation or order, exempt
specific mortgages or categories of mortgages from any or all of the HOEPA requirements, or
prohibit additional acts or practices in connection with any mortgage that the Board
determines are unfair, deceptive, or designed to evade HOEPA, or that are made in connection
with a refinancing of a mortgage loan that the Board finds to be associated with abusive
lending practices, or that are otherwise not in the interest of the borrower.” Raymond Natter,
Home Ownership Equity Protection Act of 1994, BANKING L. COMMITTEE J., July 2007, at 5,
available
at
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL130000pub/newsletter/
200708/natter.pdf; see also FCIC, supra note 9, at 10.
112
FCIC, supra note 9, at xviii. Greenspan, as a sympathetic regulator, encouraged
the proliferation of complex financial instruments, such as derivatives. See also Canova, supra
note 102, at 378.
113
FCIC, supra note 9.
114
Greenspan also kept the interest rate that banks used to borrow money from
each other low. This meant that banks could borrow money cheaply and lend it out to other
banks and consumers at higher rates to gain substantial returns and steady profit flows. Some
argue that the Federal Reserve Bank’s decision to keep the interest rate low fueled the rise in
housing prices. Canova, supra note 102, at 379.
115
FCIC, supra note 9, at xxv–xxvii.
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financial crisis.116 For example, in 2006, the BFSI created an estimated $1.3
trillion in MBSs alone and another $350 billion in CDOs tied to MBSs, from
both U.S. and international investors.117 The losses from these investments
were devastating to some of the companies that provided them as well as to
the investors who purchased them. But the BFSI also created insurance for
the risks that investors assumed in the form of CDSs, designed specifically to
insure against the risk of investing in CDOs that failed.118 For example, AIG,
formerly the nation’s largest insurer, lost $61.7 billion for guarantying the
payment of $440 billion in subprime mortgages through CDSs.119 CDSs were
not subject to any government regulatory requirements because, while
former FRB Chairman Greenspan had the authority to regulate such
products, he again opted for the neoclassical theory of self-correcting
markets to allow the BFSI to regulate itself.120 After all, this theory relies on
the BFSI engaging in practices that would protect, rather than harm, the
profit potential for its investors and stakeholders,121 a premise that proved
false.122 And, in addition to the harm caused to BFSI investors and
stakeholders, American consumers suffered devastating losses.
The BFSI has historically been resistant to regulation of its business
and consumer practices. In response to abusive lending practices, Congress
introduced consumer protection laws in the late 1960s regulating lender
consumer practices, particularly in mortgage transactions.123 Consumer
116
Id. at 9; RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 54 (noting that
Citigroup lost billions of dollars because of subprime lending practices).
117
Derivatives pooled millions of subprime mortgages into income streams in
complex vehicles called CDOs. Johnson, Post-Crisis Regulation of Financial Markets, supra
note 63; RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 54.
118
Johnson, Post-Crisis Regulation of Financial Markets, supra note 63.
119
Id.
120
FCIC, supra note 9, at 18; DiLorenzo, supra note 39, at 24–25 (discussing a
self-correcting market regime known as standard-based regulation which is suggested, versus
rule-based regulation, which sets mandatory rules).
121
See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 668 (Mich. 1919); RAMIREZ,
LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 37–38; Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics, supra
note 87, at 515; Schmudde, supra note 14, at 713–14.
122
See James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical
Assessment of the New Financial Architecture, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 563 (2009);
Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and
Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (2009) (arguing that deregulation and
failures of regulators to address asset-backed securities markets led to a housing bubble and
widespread fraud); Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial
Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 549 (2009). Cf. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM,
supra note 8, at 155–56 (inferring that profit drove banks, not charity); Johnson, Exigent and
Unusual Circumstances, supra note 19.
123
James R. Barth et al., Redlining and Mortgage Markets: The Regulation of
Financial Institutions, Financial Institution Regulations, Conference Volume 21, FED. RES.
BANK OF BOSTON (Apr. 1980). Barth states:
Prior to the 1970s, these institutions were subject to regulations
governing entry into markets and mergers as well as numerous restrictions
on interest rates that could be paid to depositors or charged to borrowers.
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protective statutes, such as the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)124 and the
Residential Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),125 slowly
worked their way through Congress with resistance from the banking
industry.126 With the BFSI’s powerful influence over the political process
affecting passage of these consumer laws, Congress ultimately passed laws
that simply mandated lenders disclose certain financial information to
consumers and curbed some practices, such as kickbacks.127 But, overall,
lenders still operated in a self-regulatory industry with minimal penalties for
non-compliance.128 Lenders had successfully usurped influence over the
legislative process.129 Even now, despite some lending practices and
mortgage products being curbed under the Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Financial Protection Act, or the Dodd-Frank Act, lenders
generally continue to operate in an otherwise unregulated manner in the
residential mortgage market.130
In the early 1970s, both major political parties came to see the
government as intrusive and ineffective in managing general economic
monetary matters.131 By the 1980s, the BFSI was the catalyst for
Recent major new regulations include: (1) the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act; (2) the Fair Housing Act; (3) the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act;
and (4) the Community Reinvestment Act. All of these new regulations
are administered by organizations already established to enforce earlier
statutes. But regulatory objectives of recent legislation differ substantially
from previous ones. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act attempts to provide
individuals with equal access to both consumer and mortgage credit. The
Fair Housing, Home Mortgage Disclosure, and Community Reinvestment
Acts are intended to improve the availability of mortgage credit to certain
individual borrowers, and/or to certain neighborhoods.
Id.

124

Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this title
to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit,
and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card
practices.”).
125
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601(2) (1974). “The
Congress finds that significant reforms in the real estate settlement process are needed to
insure that consumers throughout the Nation are provided with greater and more timely
information . . . .” § 2601(2)(a).
126
JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 134–35
(3d ed. 2007) (stating creditors wanted a degree of certainty to make it easier for creditors to
comply, but it resulted in making it harder for consumers to sue for violation of the disclosure
laws) (citing Ralph J. Rohner, Truth in Lending “Simplified”: Simplified?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
999, 999 (1981)); see also Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons From
the Truth in Lending Act, 80 GEO. L. J. 233, 233 (1991).
127
Under TILA and RESPA, violations are penalized at a statutory maximum of
$2,000 per violation although plaintiffs may bring a private right of action for actual damages,
including court costs and attorneys’ fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2012).
128
Id.
129
DiLorenzo, supra note 39, at 20; see Canova, supra note 101, at 380.
130
DiLorenzo, supra note 39, at 376.
131
Canova, supra note 102, at 376.
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deregulation of its industry. Lenders operated in a virtually deregulated
market during the years between President Reagan and George W. Bush’s
terms.132 From the Clinton years through George W. Bush’s presidency, the
lending industry set its own practices and standards subject only to the safety
and soundness standards recommended by the FRB. For instance, lenders
established new mortgage lending standards for down payment requirements,
which were eliminated by lenders in some cases through mortgages that
financed one hundred percent of the purchase price of the home.133 Lenders
also determined what type of mortgage products to offer. Such products
included high volumes of risky, new mortgage products, such as interestonly loans and hybrid loans tied to short-term, fluctuating interest rates that
created payment shock for borrowers. In addition to the mortgage products,
lenders took advantage of securitized investment vehicles created with these
mortgages, such as derivatives and various CDOs sold to investors around
the world.134 Ultimately, in the BFSI’s greedy quest for more profits, it not
only resisted external, governmental regulation, but it also ignored the duties
of self-regulation.
The BFSI managed to persuade politicians to abolish even the
minimal regulatory oversight. The BFSI was the catalyst for Congressional
repeal of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.135 This
Act was a pillar of consumer protection, designed to guard against banks
collapsing because of too much diversified risk, especially after the
government’s experiences with the 1930s Great Depression crisis.136 The
bill, its full title: “An Act to revitalize the housing industry by strengthening
132

See id. at 377; see also Di Lorenzo, supra note 39.
Canova, supra note 102, at 377. Based on the author’s years as a practitioner
performing mortgage and real estate closings, some mortgages were in the form of one
hundred percent of the property value, or two loans—one covering eighty percent of the
property value and the other covering twenty percent. There were even loans for 125% of the
property value.
134
The toxic mortgage products that underpinned the MBSs that Wall Street
investment firms placed in CDOs had no historical record of performance, and some bankers
and investors even dubbed them as “toxic” from their introduction into the market. See ENGEL
& MCCOY, supra note 17, at 9–10; Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 27, at 624; FCIC,
supra note 9, at 20 (stating “poison” was the word famously used by Countrywide CEO
Angelo Mozila); RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 53–54 (stating as early as
2006, Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozila termed Countrywide’s subprime loans as “poison”
and “toxic,” and likely to lead to bankruptcy).
135
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)–3(g)). “The Act deregulated savings and
loan associations and allowed banks to provide adjustable-rate mortgage loans. It is disputed
whether the act was a mitigating or contributing factor in the savings and loan crisis of the late
1980s.” Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Garn%E2%80%93St._Germain_Depository_Institutions_Act (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
Congress repealed the Act mostly because lenders felt the law did not allow them to diversify
their investments. See Canova, supra note 102, at 376–77.
136
See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 76 (stating that the home
mortgage market functioned well for years after the Act’s passage, suggesting that this law
and others did not inherently destabilize finance).
133
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the financial stability of home mortgage lending institutions and ensuring the
availability of home mortgage loans,” was an initiative of President Reagan’s
administration.137 The BFSI, however, saw the Garn-St. Germain Act as an
impediment to profitability because the law placed restrictions on lending
and capital requirements, as well as on the types of financial services banks
could offer.138 In seeking repeal of this Act, the BFSI, particularly
commercial banks, wanted flexibility to offer products and services, which
would maximize its competitive advantage in the national and global
markets. The goal of the BFSI, again, was to allow the financial markets to
remain self-correcting and to usurp all regulatory authority over its own
operations. With the repeal of the Garn-St. Germain Act, deregulation
enabled reckless market conduct that the BFSI never self-corrected. In
addition, in order to keep regulators at bay, the BFSI deployed its financial
resources by investing millions of dollars in lobbying efforts to influence
policymakers and to infiltrate the regulatory infrastructure. For instance,
between 1999 and 2008, lenders spent $164 million on lobbying to forestall
regulatory and oversight efforts over their lending practices.139
The BFSI fought regulation not only at the federal level, where
regulators actually had authority to regulate the industry under federal law,
but the BFSI also warded off any state action aimed at deterring its lending
practices. For example, for residential borrowers, lenders’ predatory lending
practices had escalated so substantially that some state governments tried to
take regulatory actions of their own, mainly because the federal government
would not, or had not, taken action to stop such sharp practices by the BFSI.
On one account, the Georgia legislature passed a law to expose lenders and
investors in MBSs to liability for making predatory mortgage loans.140 The
Georgia act would have imposed unrestricted liability on assignees of
mortgages (i.e., those investors who bought predatory mortgages on the
secondary mortgage market) that were made to Georgia residents and
137

See Garn-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982.
See Canova, supra note 102, at 377.
139
FCIC, supra note 9, at xxvi, 41; see RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra
note 8, at 76; Matthew Sherman, A Short History of Financial Deregulation in the United
States, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL’Y RES., at *10 (July 2009), http://www.openthegovernment.
org/sites/default/files/otg/dereg-timeline-2009-07.pdf. Sherman states:
The crumbling walls of Glass-Steagall received a final blow in
1999 when Congress passed the Financial Modernization Act, also known
as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The act repealed all restrictions against
the combination of banking, securities and insurance operations for
financial institutions. The deregulation was a boon for national
commercial banks, allowing for the formation of “mega-banks.” The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was the crowning achievement of decades and
millions of dollars worth of lobbying efforts on behalf of the finance
industry.
Id.
140
See Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1–7-6A-13 (West
2002) (amended in 2003); see also Peterson, supra note 48, at 2243–45.
138
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deemed predatory in nature.141 While the Georgia legislature passed the act
to deter lenders’ predatory behavior and protect its citizens, lenders saw the
law as a threat to their profits on the secondary market. As a result, lenders
influenced rating agencies to threaten to give poor rating to any MBSs that
included Georgia mortgages because of the potential risk of liability to
investors.142 The result would have been that lenders would have refused to
offer mortgages to Georgia borrowers if they could not sell them on the
secondary market, thereby driving lenders out of Georgia and leaving
Georgia residents with a dearth of lending options. The Georgia legislature
quickly repealed the law due to BFSI influence. Other states also tried to
pass meaningful regulatory legislation to deter lenders’ predatory behavior,
only to find that they were insufficiently protective because of the high
burden borrowers had to meet or because federal law preempted state law in
regulating national banks and the financial services industry.143
The BFSI was successful in its strategy to maximize profits
primarily because it maintained a deregulated mortgage market, both
politically and ideologically. The BFSI accomplished its short-term profit
maximization144 largely due to sympathetic regulators—most regulators had
executive management roles in various institutions in the industry. With the
flow of key regulatory officials through the revolving door between industry
and government, in the position of the regulated and then regulator, the
banking and financial services industry enjoyed the influential benefits of its
own people regulating the industry. This revolving door within the “echelons
of decision making, occurred especially between 2000 and 2007, the years
leading up the financial crisis [of 2007].”145 Prominent men who worked in
the very industry that contested any government regulation have led the
Treasury Department, the FRB, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the three most important regulatory agencies for the
BFSI. With the BFSI firmly in control of its industry and with its nearly
complete influence over the regulatory regime, the greed for unprecedented
profits left no room for protection of residential mortgage consumers,
borrowers, and related institutions—the ultimate pawns of the BFSI.

141

Peterson, supra note 48, at 2243.
Lenders’ influence over rating agencies results from lenders paying rating
agencies for their services. The interconnectedness is necessary because mortgage lenders
cannot bundle mortgages into MBSs, and, without high ratings, lenders cannot sell the
mortgages for securitization. Ultimately, neither the lenders nor the rating agencies would
make money from having no mortgages or from not having mortgages rated highly enough to
attract investors. See id.; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 17, at 47–48.
143
Peterson, supra note 48, at 2244–45 (referencing a comprehensive list of state
and municipal acts and ordinances aimed at curbing predatory lending practices and punishing
lenders for such practices.)
144
FCIC, supra note 9, at xix.
145
Canova, supra note 102, at 386.
142
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III. PAWNS THE BFSI USED FOR ITS HIGHER GREED
This section discusses how the BFSI’s profit strategy included using
citizen homeowners and residential-mortgage-related institutions as
pawns.146 Residential mortgage lending institutions in the BFSI used the
voluntary and coerced involvement of these essential pawns to their
advantage, including, but not limited to consumers, politicians, regulators,
and rating agencies.147
A. Consumer Exploitation for Profit
The BFSI strategically shaped both the primary and secondary
mortgage markets to its benefit because lenders needed a new pool of
consumers to buy the new toxic, but profitable, mortgage products it
introduced into those markets. Unfortunately, consumers were the most
negatively impacted by the BFSI-created crisis. First, lenders targeted classes
of unsophisticated consumers to place into toxic mortgage products. Second,
the financial crisis resulted in historic foreclosures and the most devastating
loss of equity wealth for citizen homeowners. Finally, consumers, through
their congressional representatives, supported the largest bailout of the
private BFSI in history following the 2007 financial collapse through the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The impact felt by taxpayers due to
the financial crisis created economic losses both at the individual and
national levels. As a result of capturing the regulatory and political regimes,
the BFSI’s exploitation of homeownership policy was especially detrimental
to citizen homeowners.148

146

See supra note 1 (defining “pawn” in the context of this article).
This article only focuses on what the author considers the most critical
categories of pawns because the BFSI would not have been able to implement its profit goals
without these categories. The author recognizes that there are many other categories of
persons and institutions, including, but not limited to, mortgage brokers, in-house bank
underwriters, appraisers, other banking and financial services institutions (e.g., thrifts and
wholesale subsidiaries), and investors on the global market (i.e., private and governmental).
See Elizabeth Devine, The Collapse of an Empire? Rating Agency Reform in the Wake of the
2007 Financial Crisis, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 177, 188 (2011); see also Conrad P.
Voldstad, Symposium Keynote Address, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 235, 236 (2013)
(providing the views of Voldstad, an executive in the derivatives market since the 1980s and a
former hedge fund manager at Merrill Lynch, head of the derivatives group at J.P. Morgan
Chase, and current chief executive of International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.).
148
Canova, supra note 102, at 380. Former borrowers who faced foreclosure lost
their homes and equity wealth, but, with settlements reached between the government and
lenders, these borrowers have only recouped a fraction of their losses. For citizen homeowners
who have been unable to refinance, sell, or recapture equity, the losses they suffered are
quantitatively irreparable in many cases. Moreover, citizen homeowners have seen no
monetary restitution from the BFSI.
147
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1. Toxic Mortgages and Related Products
Speculative, complex, and risky investment products, such as
derivatives, CDOs, and CDSs, were the BFSI’s tools for transforming the
national residential finance market to capture lucrative profits attainable on
the global level.149 Because lenders desired to capture abundant foreign
investment capital, lenders introduced new, toxic mortgage products into the
residential market; such new products were needed because the pool of
consumers eligible for less profitable, traditional products was already
saturated.150 Driven by greed, lenders could not overlook the guaranteed,
short-term profits they would gain by investing more capital into MBSs that
they could create with these toxic residential mortgages.151
In the mid-2000s, lenders used subprime mortgages to hedge their
152
risks. In order to create the tsunami of mortgage products needed for
MBSs, lenders deployed their minions comprised of mortgage originators,
including wholesale subsidiary mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers,
appraisers, rating agencies, and underwriters, among others. These minions
rounded up consumers to place in subprime and alt-A mortgages that became
the pipeline for MBSs. Critics who blame the crisis on consumer behavior
often overlook and under-emphasize lenders’ behavior in enticing
consumers, who otherwise may not have qualified for mortgages or who
were not actively seeking to refinance, into the mortgage market.153
Moreover, consumers did not demand that lenders negligently create risky,
toxic mortgage products or imprudently lower lending standards so that even
the most financially vulnerable consumers could get mortgage loans. In
addition, consumers were not involved in the placement of these
questionable mortgage products into a cluster of risky mortgage-related
security products, such as CDOs and CDSs. To the contrary, it was the
duplicitous behavior of commercial banks and Wall Street investment firms
that used the secondary mortgage market to exploit consumers for the BFSI’s
own ends.154 Mortgage industry executives and employees, through
149
FCIC, supra note 9, at 188 (finding that the three leading promoters of CDOs
were Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and UBS, which likely did not understand the risks inherent in
the products they were creating); RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 206
(explaining that CDOs were loaded with the riskiest mortgages in order to profit when the
securities sold defaulted and created massive losses).
150
FCIC, supra note 9, at 5.
151
Id.
152
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 17, at 53 n.47 (stating that at the top of the
market in 2006 and 2007, banks issued over $200 billion worth of CDOs backed by risky
mortgage-backed securities.)
153
See pond cummings, supra note 59 (comprehensively summarizing the various
perspectives on who and what caused the financial crisis).
154
Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity, supra note 109, at 168; Debra Pogrund
Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite
Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 660–62 (2009); see also pond
cummings, supra note 59, at 5; see also Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 27, at 627
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testimony and statements, have substantiated that lenders exploited
borrowers by pushing them into toxic mortgages, misleading them with
deceptive information, and making mortgages to borrowers destined for
default because of the profits that the BFSI and its investors would realize.155
In one instance, Ameriquest, a defunct mortgage lender156 sued by
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia for fraudulent loans, generated
residential mortgages to ship to Wall Street investment banks so that such
mortgages could then be sold to investors through private-label securities.157
This example captures how lenders had “shifted the lending pattern.”158 The
result was more subprime mortgages packed into more faulty MBSs. In
another instance, the nation’s then largest and most nefarious lender,
Countrywide Financial, through its wholesale division Countrywide Home
Loans, entered into the largest predatory lending settlement at $8 billion,159
with eleven states in 2008. Countrywide had misled borrowers about
information regarding risky loan features, such as adjustable rate mortgages
coupled with other volatile features.160 Countrywide knew these risky
mortgages were likely to go into default, but nonetheless generated large
volumes of such mortgages to sell to private investors on the secondary
market.161 The obvious need be stated, that lenders voluntarily made and
enticed consumers into these risky mortgages; the government was unable or
unwilling, because of BFSI influence and self-regulation, to force lenders to
act in accord with prudent lending practices.
Several scholars have offered explanations about these influences on
consumers’ behavior, especially the influences that led the consumers to take
on such highly risky mortgages in the first instance.162 The congruence
(citing Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 202
(2008)).
155
See generally FCIC, supra note 9, at 8.
156
Ameriquest was a thrift institution regulated by the former government
regulator, the OTS. As a thrift, Ameriquest only originated mortgages but was very lucrative
in doing so. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 17, at 26 (stating that by 2006, Ameriquest profits
allowed it to sponsor the Super Bowl XXXIX half-time show, although it shut down its retail
mortgage shop by 2007 and sold the rest of the company to Citigroup).
157
“Private-label securities” are those securities issued by Wall Street investment
firms, as opposed to those securities GSEs generated. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 17, at 18.
158
FCIC, supra note 9, at 12 (quoting Prentice Cox, interview by FCIC, Oct. 15,
2010). A former head of the fraud investigation department at Ameriquest told the
Commission that he detected fraud right after he started working for Ameriquest but that
senior management told him to ignore it. Id.
159
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 53.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 80; see FCIC, supra note 9 (noting that GSEs only held a small
percentage of toxic mortgages—about ten percent—but Wall Street investment firms
generated the most private-label MBSs from these toxic mortgage products).
162
Stark & Choplin, supra note 154, at 600–62 (discussing the influence of
salespersons on consumers); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and
Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 234 (2002) (describing the levels of understanding
of consumers based on educational levels and heuristics); Johnson, The Magic of Group
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among these explanations lies, in part, in consumers’ perceptions about
homeownership and in lenders’ control over those perceptions.163 What could
have made consumers invest in the riskiest, undiversified investment of their
lives is the perceived social benefit of being homeowners.164 While legal
scholarship provides an excellent sounding board about the virtues of
homeownership, at the grassroots level, lenders are not abstractly discussing
these virtues, but rather are preying on consumers’ identification with these
virtues.165 The fundamental perception that owning a home is part of the
American dream likely drove consumers to mortgages lenders that offered to
help attain this dream, without regard for the cognitive and fiscal analysis166
or whether they should even own a home.167 Some scholars have concluded
that borrowers who became homeowners did not actually increase life
satisfaction when they became homeowners because of the burdens
associated with homeownership, such as the need for additional income to
maintain the property or to pay for repairs as problems arose.168 Aware of the
social vulnerabilities consumers had in regard to homeownership, lenders
used that knowledge to their most profitable advantage.169 While lenders and

Identity, supra note 109, at 168 (identifying the types of schemes that lenders used to entice
minority borrowers into homeownership).
163
Willis, supra note 154, at 202; Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity, supra
note 109, at 168; Stark & Choplin, supra note 154, at 662 (stating consumers are influenced
by pitches from salespersons about the products they receive).
164
Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Ownership, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 890, 891 n.4 (2011) (citing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4–12
(2001)).
165
Id. at 890 (exploring the psychological, historical, and economic factors
underlying the variable citizenship effects from homeownership).
166
A ten-year study by the National Institute of Health concluded that among U.S.
students and adults, more than eighty percent of learning and reading problems were due to a
cognitive skills weakness—mental skills absolutely necessary for successful learning. If skills
are strong, learning comes naturally. If weaknesses remain hidden, a student will have to work
too hard to learn or read. See Top Ten Reasons to Test Cognitive Skills, THE GIBSON TEST
(Aug. 7, 2013) http://gcstest.com/Top_Ten_Reasons_to_Test_Cognitive_Skills.pdf; see also
Willis, supra note 154, at 202.
167
Stark & Choplin, supra note 154, at 668; Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra
note 27, at 627; Stern, supra note 164, at 891 n.4 (explaining that consumers are unlikely to
assess the psychological factors that influence their decision to buy a home instead of
continuing to rent, such as the benefits derived from citizenship virtues of homeownership
discussed by property scholars); see also FISCHEL, supra note 164, at 4–12.
168
Stern, supra note 164, at 891 n.6; William M. Rohe, The Social Benefits and
Costs of Homeownership: A Critical Assessment of the Research 11–22 (Harvard Univ. Joint
Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. LIHO-01.12, 2001), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownship/liho01-12.pdf.
169
Stern, supra note 164, at 891 n.5; Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser,
Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON. 354, 374
(1999) (explaining that empirical scholars have concluded from their findings that only
modest differences exist between owners and renters in the context of psychological and
citizenship benefits).
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their investors were making profits, homeowners were losing their
accumulated equity wealth into the trillions of dollars by early 2012.170
2. Loss of Equity Wealth
Homeownership has been traditionally tied to the ideology of wealth
building and community stability, bringing about better citizenry and
stronger communities.171 The years leading up to the 2007 financial crisis
created a misconception related to the ideology of homeownership as a
wealth-building investment because of the enormous amount of indebtedness
associated with obtaining homeownership, particularly a very large
mortgage.172 The wealth-building benefit of homeownership occurs when,
over time, the mortgage decreases and the property value increases. This
equity value is what creates wealth for homeowners. However, when lenders
introduced equity-depleting mortgage products into the residential market,
the result was not only a lack of equity-building, but also substantial equity
loss for many citizen homeowners. When the mortgage feature of an
adjustable rate required front-loading the payments with interest, or required
no equity down payment at origination, equity was non-existent, especially
in the first several years (or almost first decade), of the mortgage term.173 In
addition, when lenders introduced mortgages with volatile monthly payments
that increased due to interest rate increases, borrowers who lenders steered
into these risky mortgages found that they could no longer afford the
mortgage payments and defaulted—defaults that some lenders admit they
anticipated upon initially making such mortgages. Thus, homeownership
resulted in community instability because of the toxic mortgages lenders
eventually foreclosed on in the wake of the financial crisis—in some cases,
creating foreclosure ghost towns.174 The psychological impacts on citizen
170

Obama, supra note 31; see generally Carliner, supra note 6.
Stern, supra note 164, at 890.
172
Mortgages are the largest debt obligation most citizens will ever make in their
lifetimes. See id. at 891.
173
Some mortgages were interest-only with no principal reduction. These
mortgages were often adjustable rate mortgages with interest rates locked in for one to ten
years by some lenders. As a norm, many lenders offered interest-only loans for two to five
years so that equity building would not start until borrowers paid down the principal because
the initial monthly payment only paid for the interest on the loan. The initial perceived equity
in property was due to the inflated property values lenders used to make the mortgages, which
dropped by as much as fifty percent in some communities after the 2007 financial collapse.
John Yedinak, Home Equity Declines More Than 60% During Great Recession Says Fed
Report, REVERSE MORTG. DAILY (Feb. 13, 2011), http://reversemortgagedaily.com/
2011/02/13/home-equity-declines-more-than-60-during-great-recession-says-fed-report/. The
author’s experiences as a loan originator with mortgage brokers and as a real estate attorney
conducting hundreds of closings between 2000 and 2006 and her non-empirical research
talking with lenders and practitioners provide the basis for many of these statements.
174
Harry Bradford, Images of America’s Foreclosure Ghost Towns, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/30/foreclosures-ghost-towns
_n_840663.html#s258761&title=Las_Vegas_Nevada; Paul Toscano, Ghost Towns Seeing
171
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homeowners who faced foreclosure are significant because they and their
families were uprooted from their communities.175 Lenders who made these
mortgages, however, had little, if any, conversation with borrowers at the
outset about weighing the perceived benefits of homeownership versus the
burdens of such a debt obligation, as doing so would have been contrary to
lenders’ own interests. Thus, lenders ignored the policy of homeownership as
an equity, wealth-building means for citizens, but instead used
homeownership as a profit-building means for themselves.
The economic losses to citizen homeowners are substantial relative
to the profits still enjoyed by the BFSI. By the end of 2007, the estimated
amount of foreclosed mortgages176 equaled $400 billion.177 Between 2007
and 2009, citizen homeowners had lost sixty percent of their equity
wealth.178 By January 2012, the White House reported an estimated $7
trillion in lost equity wealth.179 Although some 2013 reports indicate an
increase in property values of around ten to twenty percent in some major
metropolitan areas where property values did not see the most significant
declines, most citizen homeowners are still suffering from significant equity
loss.180 Yet, by June 2009, the FRB reported that commercial banks were on

Signs of Life, CNBC (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/40220424; Azam Ameed &
Darnell Little, Foreclosures Spur Neighborhood Ghost Towns, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 2009,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-02-22/news/0902210271_1_ghost-towns-foreclosures
-last-year-neighborhood-stabilization-program.
175
Tatom, supra note 67, at 10 (discussing the “psychic costs” associated with
foreclosure that result when consumers can no longer afford the costs of homeownership,
including: embarrassment; loss of self-confidence and esteem for both parents and their
children; and damage to credit ratings impacting the ability to find work, to secure a new
residence, to obtain insurance, and to get credit for other goods and services).
176
Id. at 14. The loss of equity to citizen homeowners caused by reduced housing
prices is significant. Id.
177
Peter S. Goodman, Homeowners Feel the Pinch of Lost Equity, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/08/business/08borrow.html?pagewanted=all.
When home prices began to fall in 2007, owners’ equity in their real estate fell from almost
$13.5 trillion in the first quarter of 2006 to a little under $5.3 trillion in the first quarter of
2009. Yedinak, supra note 173. In that three-year period, the decline in total home equity
exceeded sixty percent, according to the report. Id. At the end of 2009, owners’ equity
bounced back a bit and was an estimated $6.3 trillion. Id. Nevertheless, the equity as of late
2009 was still more than fifty percent below its 2006 peak. Id.
178
Id. There was a decline in total home equity of more than sixty percent. Id.
179
Obama, supra note 31. By early 2012, former and current homeowners lost
equity wealth of about $7 trillion since the peak of the housing bubble in 2005. Id.
180
Ken Harney, Homeowners’ Equity Jumps 20 Percent After a Years-long Slump,
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-04/news/36210883_
1_home-equity-rebound-in-home-prices-real-estate. Some of the most impressive gains in
values were in areas that suffered the deepest price plunges—and the most painful losses in
owners’ equity—between 2007 and 2011. Id. According to a study by Realtor.com, list prices
of houses in Phoenix were 21.4% higher in November than they were twelve months earlier.
Id. In Riverside-San Bernardino, California, prices were up 13.3%; in Las Vegas, 10.6%; and
in Miami, 10%. Id.
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target for estimated profits and that stock values remained stable.181 As of
early 2013, the nation’s six largest banks reported record profits of $23
billion in the second quarter.182 The disparity in losses to citizen homeowners
is staggering, especially in light of the ongoing profits of the BFSI.
While lenders recouped their losses over a relatively short period
time between 2007 and 2013, 183 citizen homeowners who still own their
homes today are not likely to see the same recovery of lost equity. Many
borrowers lost their wealth to foreclosure, and many of the remaining
homeowners will take substantially longer to recover the equity that would
have accrued in their property if self-regulated lenders had not caused
unrealistic home value inflation to feed the secondary mortgage market.184
While the BFSI prospered from securitization of toxic mortgages and related
products, citizen homeowners fared poorly.185 The residual effect of the
181
Morten L. Bech & Tara Rice, Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at U.S.
Commercial Banks in 2008, 95 FED. RES. BULL., at A86 (June 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2009/articles/bankprofit/default.htm. The bulletin
states:
By the middle of April, about one-half of banking organizations
had reported their earnings for the first quarter of 2009. While earnings
per share (EPS) results were better than expected at some (especially
large) banking organizations, about one-third of the firms reported losses,
and about two-thirds fell short of analysts’ expectations . . . . Their
earnings results, coupled with analysts’ estimates available through midApril, indicated that banking firms will earn in the first quarter of 2009,
on average, about one-fourth of their EPS in the same quarter last year
and just slightly more per share than in the fourth quarter of 2008.
Id. (emphasis added).
182
Peter Eavis, Big Banks, Flooded in Profits, Fear Flurry of New Safeguards,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/big-banks-flooded-inprofits-fear-flurry-of-new-safeguards/?_r=0.
183
Global investors in American MBSs included foreign nations. See generally
Kerri Ann Panchuk, Hidden Foreign Investor Risk Legacy in RBMS, HOUSINGWIRE (Nov. 26,
2012),
http://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/hidden-foreign-investor-rmbsdebacle. Now, the investors who hold interests in the secondary market tranches bear most the
losses from the banks’ risky mortgage originations. According to various economic reports,
the FDIC, the Lex 2008, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin, the conclusion drawn
is that most banks were aggressively raising new capital, offsetting the lion’s share of writedowns by the end of 2007 because they sold them on the secondary mortgage market where
those mortgages were securitized and then sold to private domestic and global investors. Id.
184
Some argue that this is not likely to occur because many borrowers purchased
the property at an inflated value or, in other words, paid more than the house was actually
worth. Id.
185
The lost equity wealth relates largely to the unprecedented foreclosure rates,
resulting from lenders’ abusive lending practices. See Gretchen Morgenson, Audit Uncovers
Extensive Flaws in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/16/business/california-audit-finds-broad-irregularities-in-foreclosures.html?_r=0. The
Assessor-Recorder of San Francisco, through examining files of property recorded in the
county from January 2009 through November 2011, determined that about eighty-four percent
of the files contained clear violations of the foreclosure laws and about two-thirds had
violations and other irregularities, such as failure to warn borrowers of default, entities with
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financial crisis and the resulting mortgage and foreclosure crises is that the
citizen homeowners who kept their homes suffered a significant decline in
household wealth, which resulted in consumers’ attempt to boost savings and
cut spending in order to rebuild wealth—an impact felt by the entire
American economy.186 Wealth recovery for citizen homeowners is still
lacking from the government and the BFSI, even though the government
aided the BFSI in restoring its wealth with taxpayer funds—the same
taxpaying citizen homeowners who deserve restoration of their wealth.
3. BFSI Bailout Through the Troubled Asset Relief Program
Citizen homeowners received no government assistance after the
financial collapse in 2007, but the government allocated $700 billion of
taxpayer funds to provide relief to troubled banks and Wall Street investment
firms—the largest bailout of private financial companies in American
history.187 Specifically, in 2010, Congress passed the TARP188 to deal with
the too-big-to-fail problem, which was rooted in BFSI’s excessive greed,
deficient self-regulation, lack of transparency, and incestuous
interconnectedness. This lack of transparency related particularly to the
residential secondary mortgage market of MBSs, and it included the related
issue of how heavily BFSI institutions were invested in each other.189 As a
result, if one large financial institution failed, then all BFSI institutions
financially connected to that large institution would also fail, and the
American economy would suffer.190 The lack of BFSI transparency about its
level of interconnected investments and the true nature of the risk that the
prominent insurance company AIG guaranteed for those interconnected
investments left the government and its regulators uncertain of what would
happen to the national economy if one firm’s collapse led to a domino-effect
collapse within the BFSI. For instance, with the collapse of Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., a global investment firm, the stock market fell significantly
and global markets experienced declines. The BFSI and foreign powers
warned the government not to allow another BFSI institution to fail because
the effects would be devastating nationally and globally.191 The government
no right to assignment of loans in the chain of title, and mortgages bought back at auction by
lenders who had not proven ownership. Id.
186
Tatom, supra note 67, at 9.
187
Marc Davis, Top 6 U.S. Government Financial Bailouts, INVESTOPEDIA (July
12, 2009), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/government-financial-bailout.
asp.
188
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 1–
303, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
189
BAIR, supra note 27, at 67–68, 176, 317–18. As former chairman of the FDIC,
Bair discussed the troubles that loomed over the largest commercial banks under her agency’s
control, as well as action taken by the Federal Reserve Board under Chairman Paulson’s
leadership in relation to the largest Wall Street investment firms. Id.
190
Id. at 107–08.
191
TOO BIG TO FAIL, supra note 22.
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realized that without knowing the full level of BFSI interconnectedness, the
collapse of a major BFSI player could be economically catastrophic; as a
result, the BFSI had cornered the government into rescuing the industry.192
Thus, the government, through taxpayer funds, rescued all of the largest
commercial banks and investment firms from their bad investments and
potential losses. The bad investments, also referred to as toxic assets, were
mostly real estate assets, namely RMBSs. Unfortunately, BFSI institutions
received TARP funds without restrictions on how the funds could and should
be used to aid economic recovery and without any level of accountability
beyond repayment of the funds. Moreover, the rate the government charged
for repayment was very favorable to the BFSI. The infusion of cheap capital
had a low five percent interest rate, and the government guaranteed the debts
of many BFSI institutions, allowing those institutions to pay large bonuses
and compensation packages to executives and dividends to shareholders,
while remaining solvent nevertheless.193 In the interim, taxpayers suffered
the worst individual and national economic loss of wealth in U.S. history.
Arguably, the most significant and detrimental loss to taxpayers and
those citizen homeowners was that the government did not require the BFSI
to make restitution to borrowers for equity losses caused by the BFSI.
Lenders further dried up lending and refused to refinance mortgages that
citizen homeowners found themselves unable to repay because of steep
interest rate increases. This lender conduct following the 2007 financial crisis
was reminiscent of lender conduct following the Great Depression, when
lenders also refused to make loans prior to the advent of government
guarantees. This time, however, lenders had already captured the existing
regulatory regime, eliminated meaningful regulation that would have curbed
the conduct leading to such economic crisis, and salvaged itself and its
profits through TARP. The BFSI had successfully facilitated the rescue of its
industry, while citizen homeowners and taxpayers received scant, if any,
relief, no guarantee to prevent their losses, and little meaningful assurance
that the BFSI would aid them or the national economy. 194 Citizen
homeowners need recovery for their losses akin to the governmental
nationalization of BFSI private firms under TARP.195 For such recovery to
192
BAIR, supra note 27, at 117–19 (detailing that Citicorp needed repeated
allocation of bailout funds because of many bad investments).
193
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 86–87.
194
See generally Symposium, Four More Years? Looking Backward and Looking
Forward Regarding the Great Recession and the Law, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 281 (2012)
(providing panel discussions among Professors David Groshoff, Reza Dibadj, and Tracie R.
Porter).
195
Both state and federal governments have entered into several settlements with
banks and thrifts that committed fraud against borrowers. Nevertheless, many of the
settlements do not guarantee that banks pay anything directly to victimized borrowers. For
example, the Ameriquest settlement was for loan modifications for existing borrowers who
were required to apply and qualify under standards set by the bank for proving injury. FCIC,
supra note 9, at 12. Furthermore, during the period of investigation into Ameriquest’s
dealings, the bank’s revenues totaled $217.9 billion in loans, but the settlement was for $325
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occur, Congress first must address the BFSI usurpation of federal policy and
regulatory capture.
B. BFSI’s Influence on Policymakers and Politicians
American homeownership policy, as it relates to the government’s
lack of regulation of the BFSI, is a symptom of influence and control that the
industry has over the legislative process and policymakers. The regulators
and legislators should have provided optimal consumer protection to
residential borrowers by mandating that lenders follow prudent lending
standards. The FRB and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)196
established safety and soundness standards that lenders were to implement as
a self-regulating industry. Congress authorized the FRB to regulate and
enforce those standards against any violators.197 For example, in 1994, the
FRB had authority under HOEPA198 to set prudent lending standards that
addressed the predatory lending practices that plagued many low-income and
minority communities.199 The mortgage lenders originated in these
communities contained onerous terms that many borrowers could not meet,
thus they ultimately defaulted on the mortgages. With FRB Chairman
Greenspan’s neoclassical economic policy in place and the influence of the
million. Id. The $25 billion settlement among the forty-nine state attorneys general, the U.S.
Attorney General, and five banks benefitted former borrowers and homeowners. See NAT’L
MORTG. SETTLEMENT, supra note 20. However, borrowers indirectly benefit from the
settlement because they must make these requests for funds directly to the banks that
determine if borrowers qualify for settlement funds. Id. In the meantime, the banks control the
$22 billion of the settlement funds and hold it in their accounts. Id. Borrowers may also apply
for relief programs from their states because the state attorneys general directly received $3
billion. Id.; see also Porter, Managing Settlements, supra note 64, at 309. The nation’s former
largest mortgage lender and biggest federal lobbying force, Countrywide, settled an allegation
of fraud for $8 billion in loan modifications. Payments to Borrowers Who Lost Their Homes
to Foreclosure, NAT’L MORTG. SETTLEMENT (May 13, 2013), http://www.
nationalmortgagesettlement.com/. Approximately $1.5 billion of the $22 billion (about 6.67%)
banks agreed to pay borrowers in the national settlement is being used to compensate
borrowers who lost their homes to foreclosure during the period of January 1, 2008 to
December 31, 2011. Id.
196
12 C.F.R. § 170.1(b) (2011) (“Section 39 of the FDIC Act requires the OCC to
establish safety and soundness standards.”).
197
12 C.F.R. § 170.2 (2011). The regulation provides:
(a) Determination. The Office of Comptroller of the Currency
may, based upon an examination, inspection, or any other information that
becomes available to the OCC, determine that a Federal savings
association has failed to satisfy the safety and soundness standards
contained in the Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safety
and Soundness as set forth in appendix A to this part or the Interagency
Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards as set forth in
appendix B to this part.
Id.
198
DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 52.
199
FCIC, supra note 9.
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BFSI’s lobbying efforts, Congress did not question the FRB’s failure to
regulate lenders’ conduct, which it could have done by mandating that the
agency promulgate rules to address the issue.200 However, the influence of
the BFSI over politicians and, therefore, the legislative policy process
affected how policymakers enforced existing laws.
Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, the BFSI’s financial power made it
difficult for politicians to say “no” to the industry.201 The influence on and
control over policymakers came from the biggest and most influential
institutions in the BFSI,202 such as the growing financial giant Countrywide,
that regularly kept a presence in the nation’s capital to watch over the
legislative process to ensure that laws did not interfere with their profits.203
The BFSI used its influence and money to control whom was elected to
legislative positions and what decisions politicians and other policymakers
made while holding those positions.
The BFSI’s financial power affects whether policymakers win or
lose elections, or re-elections, particularly at the federal level.204 The
relationships the BFSI had with influential political leaders in federal
legislative positions and those who wanted to be elected to office directly
affected homeownership policymaking and regulation. During the years
when mortgage lending was at its most profitable for lenders, roughly
between 2004 and 2007, the most prevalent of these relationships seemed to
be the non-bank mortgage lenders in the BFSI,205 such as Countrywide Home
Loans206 and Ameriquest,207 also known as thrift institutions. These types of
200

BAIR, supra note 27; RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8; FCIC,

supra note 9.
201

Issa, supra note 11.
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8; FCIC, supra note 9.
203
Issa, supra note 11, at 413.
204
Top Contributors, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/
contrib.php?id=N00000286 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). For example, the largest
contributions from financial institutions, including national banks and investment companies,
to Mitt Romney’s Campaign during the 2012 Presidential Election are as follows: (1)
Goldman Sachs donated $1,033,204; (2) Bank of America donated $1,013,402; (3) Morgan
Stanley donated $911,305; (4) J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. donated $834,096; (5) Wells Fargo
donated $677,076; (6) Credit Suisse Group $643,120; and (7) Citigroup donated $511,199,
among others who donated various smaller amounts. Id.; see also Issa, supra note 11, at 412.
205
The term “non-bank mortgage lenders” is used here in reference to financial
institutions that did not engage in depository banking, but solely originated mortgages.
Subsidiaries of banks, thrifts, and Wall Street investment firms all engaged in mortgage
lending but not traditional retail banking, unlike Bank of America or J.P. Morgan Chase,
which provided both depository and mortgage lending services. See generally CORRIGAN,
supra note 5.
206
The former CEO of Countrywide Angelo Mozilo characterized Countrywide’s
subprime loans as “poison” and “toxic,” and likely to lead to bankruptcy. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS
CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 53–54 (citing FCIC, supra note 9, at 20). Countrywide Homes
Loans, as a subsidiary of Countrywide Bank, reigned supreme as the nation’s largest mortgage
lender during the real estate boom from 2000 to 2007. Id.
207
Issa, supra note 11, at 413. Ameriquest was a thrift created for the purpose of
originating residential mortgages, and it collapsed during the financial crisis. RAMIREZ,
202
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mortgage lenders led the charge in creating a roadblock that closed off
regulatory intervention in the new, risky lending practices. This roadblock to
regulation came from assuring sitting members of Congress political
contributions through political action committees and individual employee
contributions,208 as well as financial support in the jurisdictions where
members wanted to maintain political control.209
Once policymakers won elections, the BFSI created a powerful
coalition of political allies in Congress.210 For instance, in the secondary
market, a federal legislator recounts how privately owned Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac blocked legislative reform that would affect their preferential
treatment as GSEs and remove their autonomy as self-regulated entities
within the BFSI.211 For the GSEs, this meant that they would have had to
operate more conservatively without the government guarantee because of
the lack of assurance of funding from taxpayer money if they got into
financial trouble. In some instances, any policymaker who attempted to
expose the BFSI’s scandals, which other key policymakers allowed to fester,
was committing political suicide. In a reported instance, Congressman Paul
Ryan (R-WI) sought to increase regulatory oversight over GSEs, but he
found that GSE and BFSI lobbyists reported to his constituents that he was
promoting efforts to increase their mortgage rates.212 When Congressman
Christopher Shays (R-CT) introduced new legislation to Congress that the
BFSI lobbyists had not first vetted, lobbyists pressured the Congressman to
withdraw the bill by questioning his judgment and pulling resources that
promoted homeownership from his district.213
After the 2007 financial crisis emerged, and with the BFSI’s siege of
control over the policy-making process and its regulatory authorities,
Congress compromised with the BFSI by creating and passing the Wall
Street Financial Reform Act and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8. Through strategic agreements between non-bank
mortgage lenders and both GSEs and Wall Street private-label investment institutions to
deliver mortgages to the secondary market institutions to create MBSs, the BFSI assured its
success in profiting from loan originating and securitization. Id.
208
Issa, supra note 11, at 414. GSE employees contributed over $15 million
between 1998 and 2008 to campaigns of key members of Congress who served on committees
responsible for their oversight. Id.
209
See generally id. at 413. See also RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note
8.
210
Issa, supra note 11, at 412.
211
Id. The GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac spent as much as $176 million in
lobbying expenses between 1998 and 2008. Id.
212
Id. at 414. By the 1960s, the government no longer owned GSEs, but private
investors took ownership while the government acted as a guarantor for GSEs. As a result of
the financial crisis in 2007, the government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in
receivership because of the losses suffered from investments in toxic mortgages and subprime
products. It was under private ownership that the GSEs collapsed, but only after the owners
made substantial profits from them. Bech & Rice, supra note 181; pond cummings, supra note
59.
213
Issa, supra note 11, at 414.
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commonly referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act.214 This Article is not a critique
of the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act and its potential to prevent future
financial crisis. However, the Dodd-Frank Act, in its current form, is not
likely to provide the originally envisioned level of effective, meaningful, and
consumer-focused homeownership policy215 because of the BFSI’s effort to
undermine the Act.216 With the new policy in place and even with laws
establishing new regulatory and oversight policy, the BFSI’s revolving door
into the offices of its various regulators will likely keep enforcement at a
minimum or non-existent level, as was the case in the years preceding 2007.
Regulators hold the role of enforcers of law, and, therefore, Congress should
mandate regulators pursue and enforce action under the law.

214
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). This act creates
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to provide major structural changes to the
regulation and enforcement of financial consumer protections. Id. at § 1011; see also
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, www.cfpb.gov (last visited Nov. 13, 2013); see also Obama,
supra note 31.
215
Furthermore, while Congress got the industry to agree to eliminate the riskiest
loans, such as no- and low-documentation loans, the most profitable ones are still available to
lenders, such as a variety of adjustable rate mortgages used during the subprime crisis, such as
2/28 and 3/27 mortgages. Dodd-Frank Act; Christopher K. Seide, Consumer Financial
Protection Post Dodd-Frank: Solutions to Protect Consumers Against Wrongful Foreclosure
Practices and Predatory Subprime Auto Lending, 3 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 219, 236 (2012) (“Title
XIV, known as the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act . . . creates new
substantive changes for a variety of consumer financial products, most notably of which are
mortgage loans.”).
216
Matt Taibbi, How Wall Street Killed Financial Reform, ROLLING STONE MAG.
(May 10, 2012), www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-wall-street-killed-financial-reform20120510; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry's Misguided Quest to
Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 889
(2012) (“The Industry's Post-Dodd-Frank Campaign to Weaken CFPB”); see Seide, supra
note 215, at 235–36. Seide states:
The Dodd-Frank Act addresses a wide range of topics, including
key provisions such as: (1) consumer protections; (2) systemic risk
oversight; (3) executive compensation regulation; (4) bank capital
requirements; (5) ending “too big to fail” bailouts; (6) transparency and
accountability relating to complex financial instruments; (7) enforcement
of current regulations; (8) reform of the Federal Reserve; (9) mortgage
lending reform; (10) hedge fund oversight; (11) control over credit rating
agencies; (12) reform of insurance regulations and investor protections;
and (13) addressing securitization and municipal securities.”As new
legislation, most of the provisions of the Act will not be until 2014;
rulemaking also has not, or has recently, been concluded. In the meantime,
lobbyist efforts through political influence will likely gut the most
important provisions of the DFA before it even becomes effective and
enforceable. For law to be most effective, it has to be enforced, and
enforceability of the law was the essential missing component in the
events that result in the financial crisis.
Seide, supra note 215, at 235–36.
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C. One-Eye-Open Federal Regulators217
Due to federal preemption law, state regulators have little to no way
of regulating the BFSI, unless the institutions locally charter in their states.
Thus, the line of defense for citizen homeowners against the BFSI lies within
the control of federal regulators, who are unfortunately under the BFSI’s
influence.218 Specifically, the federal government has sole authority over all
of the nationally-chartered institutions. Federal homeownership policy, as it
relates to the regulatory oversight and enforcement of the lending practices
of the BFSI, falls under the authority of several agencies. The FDIC insures
consumer deposits and oversees national banks’ safety and soundness, but
the FDIC lacks enforcement authority over bank lending practices. The SEC
has authority over institutions that introduce securities products into the
residential secondary mortgage market, such as MBSs and CDOs.219 The
primary regulators of the BFSI, however, are the FRB and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).220 The FRB regulates the financial
services industry generally, but particularly national banks and Wall Street
investment firms, whereas the OCC regulates national banks.
1. The Federal Reserve Board
Congress authorized the FRB to enforce policy affecting monetary
and lending practices of the BFSI. Under its authority, the FRB can set
standards for the BFSI to follow, such as those governing mortgage lending.
The FRB has declined to use its regulatory authority to oversee or enforce
217
Eyes Wide Shut, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2008, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/
0/bf30c3d2-2877-11dd-8f1e-000077b07658.html#axzz2pk1M9iRp. This title is coined from
article’s title in the Lex Column, but the author plays on the words because in some ways the
regulators had at least one eye open and knew fraud was occurring—the open eye. In other
ways, regulators really did not know what the BFSI was doing or how interconnected the
industry’s toxic mix of products were until it was too late—the shut eye. See BAIR, supra note
27 (commenting on interconnectedness); see also FCIC, supra note 9, at xvi (discussing toxic
mortgages); see generally RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8 (on corporate
irresponsibility and lack of transparency to the markets).
218
BAIR, supra note 27.
219
While scholars have identified that the toxic derivatives market, fueled by
atomic mortgage- backed securities, caused the systemic collapse on the national and global
level, the SEC is not in the best position to address the past injury or the next future harm,
from issuance of securities tied to residential mortgages. The BFSI created and engaged in a
quagmire of derivatives tied to CDOs and credit default swaps stocked with subprime
mortgages destined to default. The SEC was not privy to these practices as they arose. See
generally Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 463 (2009) (accounting for the role
of all the regulatory agencies, including the SEC, during the government’s bailout of financial
institutions and the SEC’s role as facilitator in various mergers of institutions).
220
The FDIC has authority over banks when depository banks fail. The SEC is the
primary regulator for the residential secondary securities market, but does not have authority
over the general lending practices of the BFSI, such as mortgage lending.
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actions against the BFSI. Arguably, the policies, set between 1987 and 2006
by former FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan, aided lenders in increasing
mortgage loans and related securitized investments, allowing both the toxic
assets to arise and the troublesome interconnectedness among depository
institutions to flourish. Some scholars attribute the 2007 financial crisis to
the BFSI’s imprudent interconnectedness of loaning funds to each other. For
example, by keeping the federal funds rate low, the FRB reduced the value of
the dollar, thus pervasively boosting investments.221 The low funds rate
benefited lenders that engaged in mortgage lending because the federal funds
rate is the rate at which depository institutions (i.e., banks) lend funds or
borrow funds from each other.222 The FRB and institutions that wish to lend
funds (i.e., lender institutions) agree to this rate on individual loan
transactions, which generally are overnight in term.223 The borrowing
institution then borrows money at a very low rate (e.g., two percent) from the
lender institution, and then, in turn, the borrowing institution makes loans at
higher interest rates to consumers (e.g., five percent), for example in the
form of mortgages. The borrowing institution profits from the difference
between the rate at which it borrows and the rate at which it lends. For
example, Lender A, the lender institution, loans money out to Lender B, the
borrowing institution, at the federal fund rate of two percent (effective as of
April 30, 2008).224 Lender B then sells consumer mortgages at five percent.
Lender B then pays back Lender A at two percent and keeps a profit of three
percent. The lower the federal funds rate, the cheaper it is for borrowing
institutions to obtain money and the greater the likelihood that they can loan
money out at higher rates. This practice was prevalent among those
institutions engaged in the RMBSs market. For example, Citicorp, the bank
that obtained the largest amount of TARP funds because of its massive
amount of toxic real estate investments, found itself unable to repay its loans
to other financial institutions. Thus, if the government had not bailed out
Citicorp, the various other lending institutions that loaned it funds would
have suffered from the ripple effect.225 Thus, the FRB is responsible, to some
degree, for facilitating the BFSI’s greed-motivated behavior by failing to act
as a proactive regulator.226
221

Tatom, supra note 67, at 9.
Id. at 19. This is distinguishable from the “primary credit rate,” also known as
the “discount rate,” in which qualifying depository institutions (likely members of the Federal
Reserve Bank) borrow funds directly from the Federal Reserve Bank, generally overnight. Id.
Nevertheless, borrowing from the Federal Reserve Bank is not common or frequent for banks
that generally lend and borrow from each other at the federal funds rate explained above. Id.
223
Id.
224
For the same effective date, the primary credit rate (or discount rate) was
2.25%, generally signaling to lenders that credit was easy for them to obtain. Id. at 20
(referring to statistics from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
225
BAIR, supra note 27; FCIC, supra note 9.
226
The behavior of the Federal Reserve Bank has been more like a commercial
bank than a central bank. Tatom, supra note 67, at 24, 26. A commercial bank is one that is
constrained by liabilities and funding requirements. When a commercial bank is in crisis, it
222
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The FRB’s mindset, however, was reactive, not proactive. Under
former Chairman Greenspan for two decades and then under his successor,
former Chairman Ben Bernanke, the FRB held the regulatory position that
the markets should take care of policing themselves as that was not—and
should not—be the job of government.227 This reactive regulatory mindset
led to the FRB’s failure to use its authority as the only government agency
with the power to prescribe mortgage-lending standards for all BFSI
institutions, which, if exercised, could have stopped the subprime lending
abuses, and ultimately, the resulting financial crisis built upon those
abuses.228
It was only after the 2007 financial crisis and the Congressional
appointment of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to
investigate what led to the crisis that the nation learned about the “pervasive
permissiveness [and] little meaningful action . . . by the Federal Reserve
Bank that failed to stem the flow of toxic mortgages.”229 It was not until
2009, after the financial and resulting mortgage and foreclosure crises
erupted, that former Chairman Bernanke publicly acknowledged that the
FRB failed to act earlier in promulgating lending standards under HOEPA.230
The rules that the FRB did promulgate did not go into effect until after the
crisis—much too late to help affected citizen homeowners from devastating
foreclosures and substantial equity wealth losses.231
2. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Congress empowered the OCC to charter and supervise national
commercial banks, such as Citicorp, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America,
and Wells Fargo. The OCC’s supervision of banks included regulating
mortgage-lending standards and mortgage products. Yet, the largest
institutions the OCC regulated influenced its regulatory decision-making. An
account from Sheila Bair, former Chairman of the FDIC, stated that when
regulatory guidance designed to address the increasing risks of nontraditional mortgages (or toxic mortgages) and to tighten mortgage-lending
standards originated from OCC regulators, the BFSI criticized the regulators’
actions in the media. 232 The BFSI also successfully encouraged members of
must reduce its liabilities and increase its capital assets. A central bank, however, is one that
can print its own money. A central bank, having a demand for credit that it wishes to meet,
can simply print money—rather than selling or reducing other assets. Some scholars point out
that the great error of the Federal Reserve Bank is that it has acted like a private commercial
bank and not a central bank, such as during the Great Depression and now during the Great
Recession. Id.
227
BAIR, supra note 27.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
FCIC, supra note 9.
232
BAIR, supra note 27.
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Congress to criticize the actions of the regulators.233 Under the pressure of
both the BFSI lobby and policymakers, the OCC compromised its position so
that tougher regulatory standards would not be placed on national banks, but
only on thrift institutions then regulated by the former OTS.234 For the largest
national banks, such as Citicorp, this kept the OCC from interfering in the
banks’ risky lending and investment practices, which ultimately resulted in
Citicorp receiving two TARP fund distributions.
In the case of regulation of mortgage products, such as nontraditional235 and subprime mortgages,236 the OCC argued that thrifts, such as
Washington Mutual, Countrywide, and Golden West, primarily pushed these
prevalent mortgage products, not national banks. Some argue that national
banks did not routinely make subprime and predatory loans,237 albeit they
allowed their subsidiaries to do so. Even if national banks did not make such
mortgages, they did heavily invest in RMBSs that securitized those mortgage
loans. Nevertheless, the BFSI’s lobby once again used its financial and
political power to influence regulators either to abandon any subprime
mortgage lending guidelines or to shape the guidelines in the industry’s
favor.238 The compromise between regulators and the industry was that the
OCC agreed to guidelines that required the BFSI to provide disclosures to
consumers as to the features of certain types of toxic and subprime
mortgages.239 Still, such regulation came too late to have any impact on the
subprime and predatory mortgages lenders had made prior to 2007. Those
types of mortgages led to the national and global market collapse because
they had been bundled into securities and sold to investors on the secondary
market. Investors relied on the quality of the MBSs based on the ratings of
233

Id.
Abolished by Congress in 2011, the OTS was the primary regulatory agency of
major thrift institutions, such as New Century and Ameriquest. Id. OTS chartered and
regulated thrifts, which are institutions that hold no deposit accounts, but primarily generate
revenue from mortgage lending. Id. Thrifts grew mortgage loan balances from $727 billion at
the end of 2006 to $795 billion by the third quarter of 2007. Id. By 2007, all the high-risk
mortgage lenders regulated by OTS failed or were aquired by other institutions. Id.
235
NTMs include predatory mortgages that target borrowers with riskier credit
credentials and great potential of default. Id.
236
Subprime loans are made to persons with good credit credentials and income,
but, under these loans, borrowers are offered higher interest rates and terms when they qualify
for better rates and terms. Id.
237
Some of the biggest national banks generated substantial numbers of subprime
loans, including hybrid adjustable rate mortgages that offered an introductory teaser rate to
qualify borrowers for mortgages. After the teaser rate expired, the monthly mortgage
increased, surpassing borrowers’ ability to pay. The prior standards only required lenders to
qualify borrowers under the teaser rate and not disclose the fully indexed rate once the teaser
rate expired. See generally FCIC, supra note 9; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 17.
238
BAIR, supra note 27. Regulators wanted a definite ability to pay according to
the fully indexed rate, while lenders wanted, as argued through the OCC, a more vague
ability-to-pay standard. Id.
239
Regulators reached a compromise but not until June 2007, at the beginning of
the real estate bubble’s bursting, which was too late to help borrowers. Id.
234
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the underlying mortgages—a vast amount of which lenders knew at
origination was toxic and likely to default. Thus, the BFSI needed the
services of rating agencies to give high ratings to these investments, so they
could be sold as part of the BFSI’s quest for more profits.
D. Ready-to-Rate Rating Agencies
Essential for generating maximum profits through the sale of
RMBSs on the national and global markets were the highest ratings available
from the rating agencies. The ratings for securities investments are similar to
consumer credit scores in that the ratings inform investors of the risk
associated with the investment, just as in the consumer context a credit score
dictates whether and at what rate a creditor will extend credit based on the
credit score, which serves as a proxy for the potential for default.240 Thus, the
higher the rating, the less risk involved in the investment, and vice versa.
Investors used ratings to assist them in their decisions to invest in RMBSs
the BFSI offered. However, investors were either ignorant to or ignored the
fact that rating agencies were paid by the BFSI institutions that sought the
ratings.241 This meant that the BFSI wielded great influence over ratings
through both the information provided to the rating agencies and by directing
substantial business to these agencies.
Investors used the report-card-like letter ratings to assess the risk of
the investment. For example, the AAA rating is the highest rating and a BBB
rating is the lowest rating.242 An investment with the AAA rating would lead
an investor to presume that the investment was of the highest quality and
would yield a favorable return with low risk, whereas an investment with the
BBB rating would signal to the investor that the investment was highly risky
and that investment in that vehicle should either be avoided or that extreme
caution should be taken in investing due to the high risk of loss. Without the
positive rating given to the RMBSs the BFSI sold, investors might not have
bought in, and the BFSI would not have been able to garner such substantial
profits.243
Some commentators, as well as the federal government, take the
position that the financial crisis resulted, in part, from irresponsible ratings
by rating agencies, which misled investors.244 In order to rate investments,
however, the BFSI purchased the rating agencies’ services for the rating of
the investment products that were riddled with toxic mortgages destined for
240
Three primary rating agencies provided those designations for BFSI
investments: Standard and Poor’s, Moody, and Fitch. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 17.
241
See Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 27.
242
FCIC, supra note 9; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 17.
243
The 2007 financial crisis disclosed that not only private investors but also
foreign governments made substantial investments in residential MBSs based on the ratings.
The collapse of the United States market had a startling negative impact at the global level.
Panchuk, supra note 183.
244
Id.
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default, a fact only the BFSI originators knew.245 Much like the federal and
state politicians and the federal regulators that the BFSI captured with its
power and influence, rating agencies could only rely on the BFSI. Under the
BFSI’s robust creation of investment products, the rating agency industry
rated what the BFSI presented to it, and the presentation by the BFSI failed
to disclose adequately the inherently toxic nature of the products it packaged
for rating and subsequent investment.
The BFSI institutions that employed the rating agencies used their
powerful influence over the rating agencies to the industry’s advantage. In
some instances, it used the rating agencies to influence state legislative
action to maintain profitable creation of investments. In another instance, it
used the federal government to attack and blame the rating industry for the
BFSI’s irresponsible lending and investment practices. In both instances, the
BFSI avoided regulation, made money, and escaped blame for its reckless
conduct.
Take, for example, the State of Georgia outlined in Section II.C
above. In that instance, the legislature received pressure from lenders and
Wall Street investment banking firms, which refused to provide residential
lending if the legislature passed a law exposing the industry and its investors
to liability at the secondary market level. Specifically, BFSI lenders exerted
their influence through the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) rating agency, which
announced it would refuse to rate any securities that included mortgages
originated in Georgia.246 Because the BFSI clearly understood that investors
would not buy investments without favorable ratings,247 lenders simply
would not originate mortgages they could not sell on the secondary
market.248 This meant that mortgage funds would dry up for Georgia
consumers, making it difficult, at best, to buy or refinance homes. The BFSI
pipeline to profits simply would not tolerate any hindrances from state
legislatures, and thus, Georgia state politicians repealed the law.
At the federal level, the U.S. government took action against rating
agencies by suing S&P for its rating of CDOs, based on alleged fraudulent
behavior.249 The government’s position is that rating agencies provided
245

See Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 27.
See Peterson, supra note 48, at 2243–44.
247
Id. at 2243.
248
The most profitable aspect of residential mortgage lending was the ability to
sell the mortgages on the secondary market bundled as MBSs and then eventually into CDOs
insured by Credit Default Swaps. Johnson, Post-Crisis Regulation of Financial Markets,
supra note 63.
249
United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. CV13-00779-DOC, 2013 Westlaw
416293 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013); see also Sakthi Prasad, U.S. Asks Judge to Deny S&Ps
Motion to Dismiss Fraud Lawsuit, REUTERS (May 21, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/05/21/us-sandp-fraud-lawsuit-idUSBRE94K07T20130521 (a copy of the filed
complaint is on file with the author). The federal government’s lawsuit is based on a violation
of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRRA) and
alleges that the rating agency industry misled Citicorp, among other banks, by giving
imprudent ratings on investments that the industry should have known were misleading to
246
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fraudulent or misleading information that led to the crisis. In February 2013,
the government filed a $5 billion lawsuit accusing S&P, owned by McGrawHill Companies, Inc., of fraud for issuing inflated ratings on faulty products
to drum up business.250 The government alleges that the S&P ratings were
more than mere “puffery” and that S&P made ratings knowing investors
would rely on them.251 In response to the lawsuit, S&P filed a motion to
dismiss the action arguing that S&P made ratings based on the same
subprime mortgage data available to the rest of the market—including U.S.
government officials, who publicly stated in 2007 that problems in the
subprime market appeared to be contained.252 Arguably, the rating agency
relied on information that the BFSI presented to it. S&P also argues that it
acted in good faith and published, between 2006 and 2007, a report on the
state of the U.S. housing market and on U.S. RMBSs based on the good faith
efforts of S&P’s professionals.253 The report contained information that was
readily available from the BFSI to the market. The government action
against S&P in this lawsuit is questionable, especially in light of the findings
of the FCIC Report that faulted lending institutions, both commercial and
Wall Street firms, for imprudent, negligent, and fraudulent lending practices
that lenders often actively hid from discovery.254 In addition, as of the filing
of the government action against S&P, no BFSI institution has been sued by
the government based on fraudulent practices.255 “Now banks are the
victims,” particularly Citigroup and Bank of America,256 stated one Wall
Street Journal writer.257 The lawsuit against the rating agency is just another
example of how the BFSI’s influence, which captured consumers,
politicians, regulators, and related companies to act for its benefit. Instead of
investors. Id. Citicorp was the largest institution bailed out with TARP funds, and it had
invested heavily in MBSs, including originations. Id.
250
Id.
251
See Prasad, supra note 249.
252
Id.
253
S&P’s Response to the DOJ’s Meritless Lawsuit, STANDARD & POOR’S
RATINGS SERVS., http://ratings.standardandpoors.com/changes/company/SPs-Response-ToThe-DOJ-Complaint.html (last visited June 6, 2013).
254
Id.
255
The OCC and FRB announced in early 2013 that as a result of an enforcement
action regarding deficiencies in mortgage servicing and foreclosure processes, the regulators
had settled with four large mortgage servicers—GMAC Mortgage, HSBC Finance
Corporation, SunTrust Mortgage, and EMC Mortgage Corporation, among others. See
generally Independent Foreclosure Review, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/independent-foreclosure-review.htm (last visited
Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter FRB INDEP. FORECLOSURE REVIEW] (emphasis added). The
enforcement action did not relate to fraud in the origination of those mortgages, upon which
banks foreclosed. Id.
256
These banks are the two biggest benefactors of TARP funds, although Wall
Street investment firms were the major benefactors of the ratings for their MBSs. ENGEL &
MCCOY, supra note 17.
257
Suddenly, Banks are Victims, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2013, http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424127887323951904578291910513633152.html#.

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss1/5

48

Porter: Pawns for a Higher Greed

2014]

PAWNS FOR A HIGHER GREED

187

suing the rating agencies, federal policymakers should focus on using
taxpayer dollars to sue and recover restitution from those BFSI institutions
for the citizen homeowners harmed by their fraudulent and reckless conduct.
IV. NO HELP FOR CITIZEN HOMEOWNERS
Former and existing homeowners are the group most victimized by
the BFSI’s conduct, especially existing homeowners who lost the equity
wealth in their homes when the BFSI pillaged the housing market.258 The
$700 billion in TARP funds259 that the U.S. Department of Treasury
convinced Congress to approve to bail out the BFSI was an abuse and misuse
of taxpayer dollars. Institutions in the BFSI used those funds to minimize
their losses from the financial crisis that the industry created while citizen
homeowners are desperately trying to recover from lost equity wealth in
excess of $1 trillion. Citizen homeowners, especially those who still own
their homes, have suffered the greatest loss from the 2007 financial crisis and
have received scant assistance from the U.S. government or the BFSI.260
Even if citizen homeowners initiate their own actions against institutions in
the BFSI, the private remedies available to them are limited and often
difficult to pursue given the BFSI infiltration into policy that prohibits action
by private individuals against BFSI institutions, and under some laws, by the
government.261 Unless Congress enforces existing laws or creates new
laws262 allowing homeowners to pursue private actions against institutions in
the BFSI or seeks recourse for existing homeowners who have received no
meaningful assistance during this financial crisis, justice will not be served,
and the BFSI will remain unaccountable for its egregious actions.
258

For purposes of the rest of the article, all references to “citizen homeowners”
mean those homeowners who have not lost their homes to foreclosure, but who have suffered
a significant loss of equity in their homes.
259
See generally TOO BIG TO FAIL, supra note 22 (referring to how the
government bailed out Wall Street’s gambling problem).
260
HAMP is a program the government promoted, but it was at BFSI members’
discretion as to whether to participate in HAMP. Home Affordable Modification Program,
MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lowerpayments/Pages/hamp.aspx?gclid=CNyAyZLIw7kCFaN_Qgod-SUAdA (last updated May
28, 2013). Many of the modifications eventually led to foreclosure because of the impact of
the financial crisis on employment that caused many homeowners to lose their jobs and the
ability to pay their mortgages. Id.; The Lastest HAMP Statistics: What Do The Numbers Tell
Us?, HOUSE KEEPING REPORT: OREGON MORTG. & FORECLOSURE NEWS (Jan. 12, 2013),
http://www.housekeepingreport.com/the-latest-hamp-statistics-what-do-the-numbers-tell-us/.
261
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2012) (“[E]xcepting banks,
savings and loan institutions . . .” from enforcement action for unfair and deceptive practices
affecing commerce).
262
In the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, Congress expediently created TARP in
an attempt to mitigate losses to the BFSI and the market as a whole. See Davidoff & Zaring,
supra note 219. The indirect benefit to citizen taxpayers was to avoid a collapse of the
financial markets, but arguably, citizen homeowners still have not seen true, tangible, direct
benefits.
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The next section analyzes some relevant existing state and federal
laws that would: (1) provide the legal basis for creating new legal remedies
for citizen homeowners to employ against BFSI institutions; and (2) allow
the government to seek restitution from BFSI institutions for citizen
homeowners. This section further critiques whether existing federal law
provides the legal authority for the federal government to take action on
behalf of citizen homeowners against the BFSI, much like the action the
government has taken against the rating agencies. This section concludes
with a proposal for how the federal government can use its policy-making
power to design a remedy that provides adequate financial relief for citizen
homeowners.263
A. State Law Claim Basis
Federally chartered banks and financial institutions have never been
subject to state tort or property law.264 In either case, federal law preempts
any actions by private individuals against federally chartered banks and
financial institution.265 Moreover, the FCIC Report, congressional testimony,
and other reports substantiate how BFSI lenders cleverly engaged in
negligent and reckless business practices that may have complied with the
letter of the law, but not the spirit of state statutes regulating consumer
protection, deed recordings, foreclosure procedure, and negotiable
instruments.266 As further evidence of the chaos lenders caused as result of
the financial crisis, state court dockets are filled with lawsuits that expose the
marketing and titling mechanisms mortgage lenders invented that did not
comply with state property laws.267 While state property law does not
provide a viable cause of action for recovery, state tort law may offer some
basis for establishing new federal law upon which the government may seek
restitution for citizen homeowners.
The conduct by the BFSI fits the textbook definition of a state
negligence per se tort action. However, such action is unavailable to harmed
consumers, and no federal tort law exists. Under a negligence per se claim,
one must prove that: (1) there is a statutorily imposed duty, (2) the
263

The recent settlements between federal regulators and the BFSI have been for
former homeowners, who lost their homes to foreclosure. NAT’L MORTG. SETTLEMENT, supra
note 20; FRB INDEP. FORECLOSURE REVIEW, supra note 255.
264
The BFSI treated state property law as an obstacle to get around rather than as
a foundation on which to build responsible lending practices—practices that would have
protected citizen borrowers. Singer, supra note 57.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.; see generally Heather Hill Cernoch, Illinois Supreme Court Establish
Foreclosure Committee, DSNEWS.COM (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/
illinois-supreme-court-forms-committee-to-assist-families-in-foreclosure-2011-04-12 (noting
that by the end of 2010, more than 70,000 foreclose actions were pending in Cook County
alone, with expectations of future increase).
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wrongdoer breached that duty, (3) the breach caused some injury, and (4) the
injury rises to more than monetary damages to the plaintiff.268 On the basis of
the elements of this claim, regulators using existing laws and standards could
impose liability on BFSI institutions for their conduct leading to the financial
crisis and the financial losses they caused to citizen homeowners.269
First, the FRB’s policy promulgated under existing law that allowed
the BFSI to operate under a neoclassical economic model of self-regulation
created a statutory-like duty on the BFSI.270 Under the FRB’s safety and
soundness standards, promulgated under the 1992 Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, institutions that engaged in
mortgage lending owed a duty to American consumers to engage in prudent
lending practices, which protected the market and consumers.271 Even though
the standards were suggestive and not mandatory, the BFSI was held
accountable for ensuring its practices complied with these standards. The
evidence of the BFSI’s intentional or negligent conduct demonstrates that
many institutions within the BFSI did not comply with these standards and,
in some cases, even purposefully disregarded the standards. Thus, the law
created a duty regarding mortgage lending and securitization of mortgages
that the BFSI ultimately breached. For private individuals, a state law claim
establishing that a mandated duty was owed to them would be a huge hurdle
given the traditional creditor-debtor relationship that courts have established
exists between lenders and borrowers.272 Thus, only Congress is in the
position to establish that such duty exists and could take action on behalf of
268
In order for this to occur, a judge would first determine that the statute applies
and then determine if the applicable statute was designed to protect the class of persons in
which the victim falls. If the statute is designed to protect against the type of harm suffered,
then victims may have a remedy. At the state level, different jurisdictions have different
procedural implications for negligence per se, which is not very helpful for plaintiffs.
However, if federal courts established that the statute was applicable to the BFSI and set a
uniform procedural process, then such a process might be more helpful to plaintiffs who bring
lawsuits. See Barbara Kritchevsky, Tort Law is State Law: Why Courts Should Distinguish
State and Federal Law in Negligence-Per-Se Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 71, 73–74 (2010).
269
If Congress passed new legislation, it would be ex post facto and not applicable
retrospectively. Regulators, however, can use existing legislation to enforce against violators
and recover on behalf of the injured.
270
See DiLorenzo, supra note 39. Under the self-regulatory regime the BFSI
created for itself, it was arguably its own regulator and bound to follow federally imposed
guidelines. Id. Under the FRB-proposed standards for lending practices, the BFSI agreed to
conduct lending in a manner that would not jeopardize the financial stability of the markets
and would comport with standards that responsibly assessed the risks of its products, services,
and investments. Id.
271
Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No 102-550, 106 Stat. 3941 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501–641 (2012); see Carliner, supra
note 6, at 310.
272
Porter, Conflicts of Interest, supra note 27. If the courts were to establish that a
special relationship exists between lenders and, particularly, mortgage consumers, then, by
virtue of such a fiduciary relationship, lenders would owe borrowers a duty of loyalty and
care. Id. Otherwise, borrowers must establish that either lenders owed them a duty in contract
or statutorily, both of which courts typically have found to be absent. Id.
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borrowers or create new law that allows individuals to file a private right of
action.
Second, with an established duty under federal law for safety and
soundness, there exists ample evidence that the BFSI breached that duty. The
breach is evidenced by the BFSI’s failure to lend responsibly and by
introducing highly risky mortgage products into the residential market for its
own profitable gain. An example of irresponsible lending practices was the
introduction of highly risky products that failed to meet safety and soundness
standards, such as the low- and no-documentation mortgages, often referred
to as “liar loans.” Under these loans, lenders failed to verify the reliability of
financial information of borrowers or borrowers’ ability to repay the loans
before making the mortgages. Predatory and subprime mortgages273 are
further evidence of lax lending standards created to place borrowers into
risky mortgages that some lenders admitted were destined to default, such as
mortgages with adjustable teaser interest rates.274 Thus, these types of
lending practices and standards failed to meet the regulatory safety and
soundness standards, and they resulted in a breach by lenders of their
statutory obligations.
Third, the evidence of causation of the financial crisis is established
by the federal government’s own inquiry into and conclusions about the
lending practices that triggered the financial crisis, which were contrary to
prudent safety and soundness practices. The FCIC’s Report established that
the BFSI knew or should have known (1) that its conduct would result in
residential mortgage defaults;275 (2) that certain mortgage products posed a
unreasonable risk to residential borrowers276 and, ultimately, investors in
residential mortgage-backed securities; and (3) that the industry imposed
unproven underwriting standards that exposed the national and global
markets to inevitable risks.277 The FCIC’s report also provides
uncontroverted evidence that the financial crisis could have been avoided but
for lending practices that occurred in the U.S. residential real estate market
and the related secondary securities market.278
Lastly, the result of the financial crisis adequately establishes the
injury citizen homeowners suffered. Although the injury to citizen
homeowners appears purely monetary, particularly looking at the $1 trillion
in lost equity wealth, it was the BFSI that endured purely monetary losses,
273
Predatory lending practices—especially targeting the elderly, low-income
individuals, and minorities—that lenders created to persuade new and existing borrowers to
enter into unaffordable mortgages are the most egregious among the BFSI’s lending practices.
See Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity, supra note 109; pond cummings, supra note 59.
274
See generally Depository Institutions and Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (allowing financial institutions and
banks to charge any interest rate in lending); Canova, supra note 102.
275
FCIC, supra note 9.
276
Id.
277
Id.; RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8.
278
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8.
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from which it was ultimately rescued.279 For citizen homeowners, the aftereffects of the financial crisis also produced other intangible losses, such as
the avalanche of foreclosures that caused blighted communities and the
uprooting of families that created a drain on local and state government
resources to aid them. Additionally, it produced the loss of jobs for those in
the banking, real estate, and mortgage industries. In the most disturbing
cases, the crises led to the loss of life for those who could not bear the loss of
their life savings (in the form of equity wealth in their homes.) While
recoverable personal financial losses for citizen homeowners includes equity
wealth, the devastation of the financial crisis to the lives and communities is
impactful.
The loss of equity wealth also resulted in losses in other areas. For
example, home repairs stifled because financial resources in households
dropped or dried up. Historically, homeowners have relied on equity lines of
credit for major repairs, such as roof work, windows, and general
maintenance. With property values already significantly devalued, homes in
significant disrepair are even more devalued. Many homeowners suffered
emotional distress because of the loss of their equity wealth or even their
homes. Some scholars have even identified the emotional toll on children
who were impacted during financial crisis, especially when they were forced
to leave their homes due to foreclosures or when they were privy to the
stressful financial circumstances resulting in the necessity to sell their
homes—displacing them from their communities.280 The injuries citizen
homeowners suffered were primarily monetary, but the impact of those
monetary losses resulted in real, tangible injuries. As the cause of these
injuries, the BFSI must be forced to make restitution because of its blatant
disregard for anyone or anything but its own greed.
While no federal tort claim exists for citizen homeowners, the
federal government, through the regulatory agencies charged with enforcing
existing laws, may arguably pursue action based on the spirit of a tort
negligence per se claim for harm the BFSI caused consumers. Furthermore,
to deter future negligent behavior, Congress could promulgate new laws to
seek restitution for citizen homeowners or to allow consumers to file a
279
Despite banks that received TARP funds making full repayment and allowing
their institutions to recover from perceived losses because of the financial crisis they caused,
American homeowners did not get the chance to receive similar assistance to avoid a collapse
of their households. The financial industry’s drain of $700 billion in taxpayer resources that
could have been used to bailout Americans, not banks. Matt Egan, Bank Crisis is Over, But
TARP Bailout is Still Alive and Kicking, FOXBUSINESS (July 16, 2013),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2013/07/15/banking-crisis-is-over-but-tarp-bailout-isstill-alive-and-kicking/. While big banks like J.P. Morgan, Chase, and Citigroup could not
return their TARP funds fast enough, dozens of publicly-traded lenders and thrifts are still
sitting on nearly $5 billion in bailout cash some four years after the Great Recession ended. Id.
280
Phillip Lovell & Julia Isaacs, The Impact of Mortgage Crisis on Children,
FIRST FOCUS, May 2008, http://nhcsl.org/demo2013/pdf/HousingandChildren-%20First
%20Focus.pdf (discussing how physical and mental health and well-being have impacted
homeowners, their children, and their communities).
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private right of action to seek redress. Congress must act because it has the
power to establish the legal basis upon which restitution can be made to
citizens.
B. Federal Law Claims Basis
The federal government enacted statutes and agencies that govern
the conduct of businesses, including banks and financial services institutions,
in relation to American consumers. The most relevant among those statutes
are the FTCA and, most recently, the Dodd-Frank Act.281 Congress has the
authority to hold the BFSI accountable for its negligent, deceptive, and
egregious acts toward citizen homeowners, and it can mandate that authority
be enforced through the FRB, which has statutory authority over banks and
financial institutions.
1. The Federal Trade Commission Act
Under the FTCA, the FTC prescribes rules defining the types of acts
or practices in or affecting commerce that are unfair or deceptive to
consumers given the current activity of business in relation to consumers.282
The FTC periodically publishes rules depending on the need for consumer
protection, such as in 2003 when it promulgated rules on unsolicited bulk
electronic mails, or spam, in part because spam serves as a vessel for
deceptive practices. Using those rules as a guideline, the FTC may enforce
violations against businesses that contravene its rules.283 The FTCA,
however, specifically exempts banks from coverage, but not other investment
firms and financial institutions that engage in bank-like activities. 284
Therefore, regulators should enforce existing law, including claims for fraud,
and even criminal charges (as necessary), against those entities that are not
exempt. In addition, Congress should amend the FTCA to allow the FTC to
rely on its 1983 Policy Statement on Deception to seek recourse in the future
against banks and all financial institutions in the BFSI that engaged in
prohibited deceptive practices.285
281

15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012).
283
The rules set forth by the FTC, referred to as Trade Regulation Rules, define
unfair and deceptive practices on specific topics. CONSUMER PROTECTION HANDBOOK 27, 48
(Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Antitrust Law 2004).
284
Although 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) gives power to the Commission to investigate
persons, partnerships, or corporations, it excepts banks and savings and loan institutions
described in Section 57a(f)(3) in the Act. Nonetheless, Congress, which has the authority to
amend existing laws or create new laws, could make banks and financial service institutions
subject to the FTC and deter future behavior.
285
The retrospective impact of the law on banks makes it impossible to seek
redress against them because of the exemption. The overall objective is to deter fraudulent
behavior that harms consumers.
282
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Looking at the manner in which lenders used advertising, among
other marketing practices, to lure borrowers into mortgage transactions
during the residential real estate boom from 2004 to 2007, Congress is well
justified in amending the FTCA, or otherwise promulgating new law, to
allow the FTC to enforce the deceptive practices laws under the FTCA
against institutions in the BFSI industry. Bringing the BFSI under the
enforcement authority of the Commission would allow the agency to
maximize consumer protection and prevent future abuses in residential
mortgage transactions against all institutions, especially given the failure of
the FRB to act in the years leading up to the 2007 financial crisis.
The FTC is well suited to use precedent to apply its 1983 Policy
Statement on Deception, particularly as it relates to the advertising context,
to prohibit businesses from engaging in practices that are likely to mislead
consumers.286 The FTC policy does not require actual deception to hold that
a violation has occurred, but rather it looks at the act or practice from the
perspective of the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances.287 The
materiality of the practice is also important if it involves providing
information that would likely affect consumers’ choices or conduct regarding
the product.
If the FTC applied its policy by looking through the lens of
consumers, it would see that non-exempt BFSI lenders actively engaged in
conduct, particularly through advertising and third parties, that misled
residential mortgage consumers to enter into the most risky and unsuitable
mortgage products. In a substantial amount of transactions, the information
lenders in the BFSI provided to consumers was deceptive and misleading.288
These transactions are the basis upon which the state attorneys general have
sued those lenders that conducted themselves in the most egregious manner
in order to recover restitution on behalf of former citizen homeowners in
their state who had no remedy under state or federal law.289 Given the
egregious predatory lending practices of lenders and the gross amount of
foreclosures in their jurisdiction, the state attorneys generals’ lawsuits are
based on the premise that the spirit of the FTCA was violated because those
institutions engaged in unfair and deceptive practices.290 Congress should

286

See In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 110 (1984). The Commission,
using the Policy Statement on Deception that was issued October 14, 1983, found an act or
practice to be deceptive if the representation, omission, or practice is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. and the representation, omission, or
practice is material. Id.
287
SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 126, at 41.
288
FCIC, supra note 9.
289
See Porter, Managing Settlements, supra note 64.
290
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (declaring that “unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful”). Every state has promulgated an unfair and deceptive practices act,
which are known as “little FTCs.”
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also enforce the FTCA against all non-exempt institutions and ultimately
allow for such enforcement against banks.
Within its authority, the FTC may seek a cease and desist order or, as
historically sought, fines. The FTC, however, should further consider other
equitable relief, such as restitution.291 Taking into account the conduct of the
BFSI, the federal government established evidence through the FCIC Report,
which included the uncontroverted admissions of industry executives who
testified before the FCIC, that institutions in the BFSI engaged in unfair and
deceptive practices that caused harm to consumers.292 In addition, lenders
engaged in egregious and predatory lending practices involving deceptive
marketing to draw consumers into their mortgage products, particularly lowincome, elderly, and minority consumers.293 Lenders also engaged mortgage
brokers to put borrowers into the riskier, higher-cost mortgages by paying
them a yield spread premium, or a commission, which neither lenders nor
mortgage brokers disclosed to borrowers.294 Relying on the FCIC’s report,
findings, and gathered evidence, the FTC may take such other investigatory
action it deems necessary to discover specific unfair or deceptive practices
that lender institutions engaged in that resulted in harm to citizen
homeowners during the housing boom from 2004 through 2007.295
Thus, to deter future bad lending practices, Congress should amend
the FTCA to include the BFSI’s practices in the residential mortgage market.
In addition, Congress should authorize the FTC to commence an action
against the most culpable financial institutions who currently exist or who
acquired through mergers those financial institutions that committed unfair
and deceptive practices against citizen consumers during the height of the
subprime herding from 2004 through 2007. The funds the FTC recovers from
291

15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m).
See generally FCIC, supra note 9, at 230. The FCIC concluded that the privatelabel securities that Wall Street financial firms bundled and sold had high delinquency rates,
but investors purchased and guaranteed them nonetheless. Id. Taking into account the BFSI’s
conduct, the BFSI engaged in risky mortgage lending through lax mortgage standards
instituted for the sake of lucrative, short-term profits, despite the knowledge that many of
those mortgages were likely to default. Id. Lenders, especially those like Countrywide Homes
Loans, used their wealth and influence to keep regulators at bay. Id. at xxii; Issa, supra note
11. Even the securitizers knew that a significant percentage of the mortgages they acquired did
not meet sound underwriting standards, either their own standards or those of the industry in
general. FCIC, supra note 9, at xxii.
293
Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity, supra note 109; pond cummings, supra
note 59.
294
FCIC, supra note 9, at xxii. The Commission concluded that there was a
systematic breakdown in mortgage lenders’ accountability to both consumers and the financial
markets, ultimately eroding the public’s trust in those markets. Id. Under lax lending standards
and a non-regulatory environment, lenders reported a twenty-fold rise in financial crimes
related to mortgage fraud between 1996 and 2005; that rate again doubled between 2005 and
2009—to the tune of $112 billion. Id.
295
Between the summer of 2006 and late 2007, the percentage of borrowers who
defaulted on their mortgages nearly doubled, while lenders’ profits rose substantially. See
Corporate Profits After Tax, supra note 17.
292
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equitable relief, such as fines and settlement funds from those institutions,
should be used to make financial restitutions to existing citizen
homeowners.296
2. The Federal Reserve Board
Arguably, the FRB has the authority to bring action against BFSI
institutions, but the FRB’s track record with regard to enforcement actions
against banks is poor, with only one such action being filed against banks
because of the financial crisis.297 The basis of such action would be the
breach of the safety and soundness standards that the BFSI disregarded for
the sake of profit.298 However, by allowing the BFSI to become a selfregulating industry, the FRB left itself with little basis for enforcing its nonmandatory safety and soundness standards. In fact, the primary action the
FRB has taken is to re-promulgate the non-mandatory safety and soundness
standards, which hardly bring the BFSI to account for its practices.299
Furthermore, the influence of the BFSI over the FRB is prominent. The BFSI
has used its lobbying influence and political capital to ensure minimal
regulation by its regulators. This is clear from the FRB’s failure to regulate
or investigate BFSI institutions in the BFSI during the height of BFSI
activities leading to the financial crisis.300
296
Any settlement lenders make to citizen homeowners must allow the
homeowners to either: (a) pay down the principal on the mortgage to recapture loss equity, or
(b) obtain no-cost grants to make major home repairs that they have been unable to access
equity to make. In both instances, the restitution would need to be without tax repercussions,
similar to the exception under the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act (MFDRA) that
allowed for homeowners who sold their homes through lender short sale programs to avoid a
taxable event. See Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121
Stat. 1803 (2007). For further discussion of the MFDRA, reference the author’s forthcoming
article on mortgage short sales, currently entitled Corporate Abuse of Residential Short Sales
and the Negative Tax and Financial Impact on Consumers. (A copy of the manuscript is on
file with the author).
297
RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 8.
298
This argument is arguably akin to a negligence per se claim because statutorily,
or in this case according to recommended regulatory guidelines, members of the BFSI
disregarded the law, which was the standard and caused harm as a result.
299
Reiss, Message in a Mortgage, supra note 31, at 3. “Payment shock”
mortgages were those in which borrowers saw a dramatic rise in their monthly mortgage
payment after an earlier period, usually two years, of lower monthly payments. Id. at 6. With a
trillion-dollar market in their sight, banks offered products that contradicted soundness and
safety standards, such as mortgages with “payment shock,” negative amortization, and no
document verification. Id.
300
See Porter, Managing Settlements, supra note 64 (citing Vincent DiLorenzo,
The Federal Financial Consumer Protection Agency: A New Era of Protection or More of the
Same? 7, 9 (St. John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-0182, Sept. 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1674016). Banks are regulated by various
governmental agencies, including the FRB. Id.; see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES.
SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/reglisting.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2013)
[hereinafter FRB]; see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.
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Congress could use its authority over the FRB to force an action
against the national banks and investment banks that took advantage of
TARP funds to cover their economic losses. Recovery funds these
institutions pay would directly assist in the economic recovery of citizen
homeowners, especially those still suffering from significant devaluation of
their residential property. After-the-fact oversight by the FRB could still
provide relief for citizen homeowners, through monetary restitution paid by
institutions in the BFSI. Institutions in the BFSI can amply afford to repay
citizen homeowners for their losses. Congress is citizen homeowners’ only
hope.
3. The Wall Street Reform Act and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(Dodd-Frank Act)301
In response to the 2007 financial crisis, Congress’ 2010 passage of
the Dodd-Frank Act was a reactive attempt to regulate the BFSI. Due to the
economic collapse, the unprecedented use of taxpayer funds used to bailout
the BFSI, and the public call for accountability, the Dodd-Frank Act was
enacted to make changes in how federal regulators oversee the BFSI in hopes
of preventing future financial crises of the magnitude realized in 2007. This
article is not an analysis or critique of the substantive provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act,302 but this article does analyze the potential regulatory
impact of the law given the BFSI’s powerful influence over regulatory and
enforcement activities.303 The regulatory impact is still unknown given that
most provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act do not become effective until after
the comment period expires in 2014.
In the meantime, legions from the BFSI’s lobby immediately began
their charge to minimize the impact of policy changes under the law on the
industry shortly after Congress passed the law.304 Policymakers, likely
influenced by the BFSI, have introduced various laws or stalled rulemaking
to mitigate the law’s impact on the industry.305 As early as 2010, Republican
occ.treas.gov/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2013) [hereinafter OCC]; see also SEC, http://www.
sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
301
See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
302
The law requires that regulators create 243 rules, conduct 67 studies, and issue
22 periodic reports. Id.
303
As with other major financial reforms, critics have attacked the law. Some
argue that it was not enough to prevent another financial crisis or more “bailouts,” and others
argue it went too far and unduly restricted financial institutions. See generally Michael
Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213, 213 (2011).
304
“In a furious, below-the-radar effort at gutting the law—roundly despised by
Washington's Wall Street paymasters—a troop of water-carrying Eric Cantor Republicans are
speeding nine separate bills through the House, all designed to roll back the few genuinely
toothy portions left in Dodd-Frank.” Taibbi, supra note 216.
305
“This stuff doesn’t get any better with time,” said former FDIC chairman
Sheila Bair, a key figure in the Dodd-Frank approval process prior to leaving office. “The
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policymakers were leading the charge, but it is likely that Democratic
policymakers also aided in what one commentator referred to as
“[q]uislingian covert assistance,”306 in order to eliminate any meaningful
debate about the Dodd-Frank Act’s fate.307 As of June 2013, the rulemaking
process under the Dodd-Frank Act met with little success. One commentator
blamed the delay on the well-funded finance-industry lobby, as well as the
legal battles and resistance in Congress.308 The lag in implementing
meaningful regulations is also due, in part, to a regulatory system in which
multiple federal agencies, with irreconcilable views, are tasked with
shepherding the complex legislation into final rules.309
Regulatory agency enforcement of the law is also a quagmire.310
With eleven agencies charged with rulemaking authority, the potential for
confusion, loopholes, and conflict is likely, especially given the lack of
cooperation among regulatory agencies leading up to the financial crisis. As
Sheila Bair, former FDIC Chairman, accounted, the powerful leaders of the
Treasury Department, responsible for suggesting the TARP, and the FRB,
responsible for primary oversight and consolidation of BFSI institutions
during the financial crisis, proved most influential in serving the needs of and
protecting the economic losses of the BFSI.311 The unprecedented assistance
these agencies provided to the BFSI may likely be tied to the fact that the
heads of these key agencies were former executive-level managers in BFSI
institutions prior to taking their public positions. In some cases, heads of
these and other regulatory agencies either remained closely connected to the
industry or returned to the industry upon leaving public office.312 Ultimately,
the BFSI’s influence over regulators remains intact and will likely dominate
future regulatory relationships given the new, broad spectrum of regulatory
control across a vast number of agencies.313 For instance, the power of the
longer you wait to finalize the rules, the more they get watered down, the more exceptions that
get built in, people’s memories about the crisis start to fade and the pressure isn’t there.”
Kevin McCoy, Dodd-Frank Act: After 3 Years, A Long To-Do List, USA TODAY
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/03/dodd-frank-financial-reformprogress/2377603/ (last updated Sept. 11, 2013).
306
This term “quisling” is defined as: “A traitor who serves as the puppet of the
enemy occupying his or her country.” WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 931 (3rd ed.
2008).
307
Taibbi, supra note 216.
308
McCoy, supra note 305.
309
The chances of all agencies coming to an agreement on an 848-page bill is
more than challenging. Id.
310
See generally DAVID POLK & WARDWELL, LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODDFRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY
21, 2010 (2010), available at http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/files/Publication/
7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Preview/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be04e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_Summary.pdf.
311
BAIR, supra note 27.
312
Id.; Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 219.
313
In August 2013, in the author’s personal interaction and account with a
practitioner who works for a large, east coast law firm as partner handling federal regulatory
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BFSI was successful in blocking the appointment of Congresswoman
Elizabeth Warren, formerly a Harvard Law Professor who developed the
notion of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), from heading
the newly created agency,314 as well as blocking its ability to address the
enforcement activities of the BFSI that led to the financial crisis.
The congressional mandates for the CFPB seriously hindered its
enforcement activity vis à vis the BFSI. While the CFPB came into existence
immediately upon passage of the Dodd-Frank Act with a strong statement
about its enforcement-action authority related to credit card violations,315 the
paramount issues related to MBSs, CDOs, and other securitization-related
transactions, which caused the financial market collapse, were, and arguably
still are, beyond the reach of the CFPB.316 The numerous advisements and
inquiries the agency must make through other bank regulators are likely to
hinder the enforcement effectiveness of the agency. For example, before
issuing any regulatory recommendations against banking and some nonbanking institutions, the CFPB must coordinate with other regulators to
prevent undue regulatory burden on banks.317 Bank regulators may also
appeal, or challenge, the CFPB’s proposal to take enforcement action if the
other bank regulators deem the regulations put the safety and soundness or
stability of the bank or BFSI at risk.318
It is, and will be, a turf war between the CFPB and ten other
regulatory agencies charged with regulation of the BFSI, especially given
powerful allegiances of the leadership at the Treasury Department, FRB,
FTC, and SEC, as well as the roles of these four agencies on the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), created by the Dodd-Frank Act.319 The
FSOC is charged with identifying and responding to emerging risks
throughout the financial system. The most powerful influence on the FSOC
is the Treasury Secretary, who chairs the FSOC. The other federal regulator
enforcement actions for the firms’ clients, this person shared personal experiences with federal
regulators. The person stated that, in dealing with institutions in the BFSI, regulators are very
cooperative with BFSI institutions because of regulators’ prior employment relationships in
the BFSI or their future ambitions to join or return to the BFSI upon leaving public service.
314
“With Geithner and Republicans in Congress blocking her once-inevitable
appointment, we no longer had Warren playing watchdog to Federal Reserve chief Ben
Bernanke—instead we had new CFPB head Richard Cordray, a former Ohio attorney general
who enjoys far less of a popular mandate than Warren, forced to operate within the
bureaucracy of Bernanke’s Fed.” Taibbi, supra note 216.
315
This statement relates to its action against Capital One for credit card violations
and the fines it issued. See Probe Into Capitol One Credit Card Marketing Results in $140
Million Consumer Refund, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, July 18, 2012, http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/cfpb-capital-one-probe/.
316
DAVID POLK & WARDWELL, LLP, supra note 310.
317
Id.
318
See S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, Brief Summary of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act http://www.banking.senate.
gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final
.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Summary].
319
BAIR, supra note 27; TOO BIG TO FAIL, supra note 22.
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members include the heads of the FRB,320 SEC,321 Commodity Futures
Trading Commission,322 OCC,323 FDIC,324 Federal Housing Finance
Agency,325 National Credit Union Association,326 and CFPB.327 The
effectiveness of the new regulatory regime, placed in the auspices of these
agencies, remains to be seen.
Yet, the Dodd-Frank Act’s after-the-fact regulatory attempt does not
deal with past harms to consumers. The law was arguably a prime
opportunity to do so. However, the law does not mandate that any regulators
take retrospective enforcement action against the BFSI, which is action
Congress should pursue against the egregious behavior of institutions in the
BFSI that harmed citizen homeowners.
V. THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY FOR EXISTING CITIZEN
HOMEOWNERS FUND
In the height of the aftermath of the financial crisis, citizen
homeowners lost in excess of $7 trillion in equity wealth. Some citizen
homeowners will never recover their lost equity due to the loss of their
property to foreclosure or short sales.328 Other citizen homeowners who still
own their homes are not likely to see property values increase significantly
320

FRB, supra note 300.
SEC, supra note 300.
322
Congress created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in 1974 as an
independent agency with the mandate to regulate commodity futures and option markets in the
United States. The agency’s mandate has been renewed and expanded several times since
then, most recently by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/About/index.htm (last visited
Dec. 31, 2013).
323
OCC, supra note 300.
324
See BAIR, supra note 27.
325
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) was created on July 30, 2008,
when President Obama signed into law the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. The
Act gave FHFA the authority necessary to oversee vital components of the country’s
government-sponsored entities on the secondary mortgage markets, namely Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=4 (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
326
The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) is the independent federal
agency that regulates, charters, and supervises federal credit unions. With the backing of the
full faith and credit of the U.S. government, NCUA operates and manages the National Credit
Union Share Insurance Fund, insuring the deposits of nearly ninety-four million account
holders in all federal credit unions and the overwhelming majority of state-chartered
institutions. NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., http://www.ncua.gov/about/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
327
The FSOC also has five non-voting members, including representatives from
the Office of Financial Research, the Federal Insurance Office, state banking, insurance, and
securities regulators, plus an independent appointee with insurance expertise as a voting
member. See Dodd-Frank Summary, supra note 318.
328
For a discussion of the effect of short sales on borrowers, contact the author for
her work-in-progress. MFDRA, supra note 296.
321
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enough to recapture much of the lost equity.329 Without any direct recourse
against lending institutions that held or hold mortgages, citizen homeowners
are at the mercy of Congress, which is in the best position to assist them in
recovering their losses. Congress has made that effort for former citizen
homeowners. In 2013, former citizen homeowners received direct, partial
restitution,330 although in very modest amounts, from a fund paid into by ten
of the nation’s largest lenders as the result of a rather covert settlement
between regulators and financial institutions for foreclosure abuses.331 For
existing homeowners, however, other than refinancing programs that have
been painfully ineffective for most, Congress has not taken any meaningful
action to construct an enforcement or settlement action. Congress, therefore,
should use its authority through existing laws or enact new laws to seek
recovery from the BFSI that directly benefits existing citizen homeowners
for lost equity wealth.
This proposed Economic Recovery for Existing Homeowners Fund
is not a fund that would be uncommon to Congress. Similar to other recovery
329

For a common example, one borrower paid $723,500 for his three-bedroom
house in July 2006, taking out $651,000 in mortgages to buy the property, which equated to a
ten percent equity down payment. As of January 2013, the borrower estimated his home was
worth about $440,000, or about a forty percent less than he paid. The down payment is a
direct loss to the borrower, and the thirty percent property devaluation is an indirect loss of his
equity wealth. See Richard Clough & Jeff Collins, Foreclosure Settlement Cash a Few Months
Away, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 9, 2013, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/foreclosure382857-homeowners-loan.html.
330
This article does not discuss the settlement in detail, as the issue of the
effectiveness of settlements is a topic for the author’s work-in-progress, currently entitled A
Slap on the Hands for Banks–Consumers Settlement in the Great Recession. (A copy of the
forthcoming manuscript is on file with the author). See generally id. The FRB negotiated an
$8.5 billion foreclosure-abuse settlement with ten large banks. Nearly four million former and
existing homeowners who were foreclosed upon or who were in the foreclosure process will
receive compensation without being required to prove wrongdoing related to their mortgages
or take any action to obtain the funds, even if they did not apply for a foreclosure review, as
previously announced by regulators. Under the settlement agreement, which ended a
nationwide foreclosure review program, the banks will collectively pay as much as $3.3
billion directly to 3.8 million affected borrowers. The deal also designates $5.2 billion for loan
modifications and other assistance to borrowers but for which borrowers will have to apply to
obtain relief. Id.
331
Eleazor D. Melendez & Ben Hallman, Foreclosure Review in New Settlement
Leaves Homeowners in Banks’ Hands, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2013), www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/01/07/foreclosure-review-settlement-banks_n_2426437.html (providing a statement
from Rep. Elijah E. Cummings (D-Md.), ranking member of the House Committee on
Oversight and Government, who said that he was “deeply disappointed” that the regulators
decided to proceed “before providing Congress answers to serious questions about how this
settlement amount was determined, who these funds will go to, and what will happen to other
families who were abused by these mortgage servicing companies”). Cummings went on to
say, “I believe that borrowers deserve more answers and transparency than the Federal
Reserve and the OCC are currently willing to provide.” Id.; see also Ben Hallman, Recent
Foreclosure Settlement Was a Win for Big Banks, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/25/foreclosure-settlement-bigbanks_n_2551727.html.
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funds created as a result of settlements with banks, the federal government
would collect the money and designate a regulatory agency or an
independent third party to distribute the funds to citizen homeowners. An
enforcement action would seek recovery from the most egregious lenders in
the BFSI, not only banks but also Wall Street firms. Much like the
foreclosure abuse settlement of 2013, direct restitution would be paid to
existing citizen homeowners who took out or refinanced their loans with, but
not limited to, any of the following lenders between 2002 and 2007:
Citigroup,332 Bank of America (which acquired Countrywide, which in turn
acquired Merrill Lynch),333 JP Morgan Chase Bank (which acquired Bear
Sterns with government assistance and Washington Mutual), Wells Fargo
(which acquired Wachovia Bank), Bank of New York, and State Street
Corporation. Recovery would also be sought from the following investment
banks: Goldman Sachs (in which Warren Buffett infused $5 billion in
capital) and Morgan Stanley (in which Mitsubishi Bank, a Japanese
company, infused capital).334 These institutions either acted directly or
acquired financial institutions whose actions significantly contributed to the
financial crisis and which took out the largest TARP funds to minimize their
economic losses during the financial crisis.335 Just nine banks and financial
service institutions in the BFSI own $9 trillion in assets and comprise more
than seventy percent of the U.S. financial system. They can afford to help
existing citizen homeowners recover their lost equity. They can also use
some of the profits gained during the years leading up to the financial crisis
and the $700 billion in taxpayer funds336 that bailed them out to repay
existing citizen homeowners.
When the government utilized TARP funds to aid BFSI institutions,
none of those institutions needed to prove their losses in order get help; in
other words, the government eliminated bureaucracy. Even more startling,
332

Citigroup received TARP funds at least twice after the financial crisis began.
See BAIR, supra note 27.
333
Shannon D. Harrington & Hamish Risk, Bank of America Credit Risk Increases
on Countrywide Purchase, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=adjOxU6pIVyY&refer=home; Steven Sloan, When a Job
Becomes a Policy Lever, FIN. PLANNING (July 17, 2009), http://www.financial-planning.com/
news/paulson-merrill-lewis-2663309-1.html.
334
Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 219.
335
See Latest TARP Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
336
TARP funds were allocated to banks as follows: $25 billion each to Citigroup
and Wells Fargo; $15 billion to JP Chase Bank; $10 billion to Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs,
and Morgan Stanley; $3 billion to Bank of New York; and $2 billion to State Street
Corporation. Citigroup also receive two additional infusions of capital from TARP funds
when no other banks did. All institutions repaid the TARP funds with money left over to pay
elaborate bonuses to executives. The rate of return on the funds was only a five-percent
dividend on non-voting preferred stock held by the government, making it the cheapest capital
and debt guarantee any bank would ever receive. Id.; see BAIR, supra note 27 (giving her
perspective about the decisions made by the Treasury as to which institutions received TARP
funds).
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BFSI institutions were under no mandate as to how they could use the funds
they received. Similar to the flexibility offered to institutions in the BFSI, a
recovery plan and funds distribution, very similar in protocol and process,
should exist for existing citizen homeowners who borrowed money from any
of these institutions. Once regulators determine the egregious nature of the
institutions’ conduct, potentially based on the default rates of predatory and
subprime loans held by or acquired by lenders, the institutions then would
make a direct credit to borrowers’ mortgage accounts. This direct credit
would create a new escrow account that borrowers could either use to pay
down the mortgage principal (in lieu of loan modification)337 or to pay down
established impounds for current or retrospective real estate taxes and
insurances on the account (if any).
Congress also must ensure that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
would not treat these funds as income taxable to borrowers, much like the
exemption the IRS recognizes under the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief
Act.338 Citizen homeowners should not be penalized. If the government
allowed these funds to be taxable income, the program would become an
additional blow to existing citizen homeowners who have been economically
crippled by the actions of the BFSI.
Some commentators argue against blaming the BFSI for the financial
crisis and resist any regulation or any additional regulation.339 Other
commentators place the burden and blame on consumers who invested in the
risky products and services the BFSI offered.340 Ultimately, the public
confidence in the market is what allows the BFSI to operate, and the social
contract proposed by some scholars obligates the BFSI to honor the
relationship it has with the government and consumers by acting prudently in
its practices.341
On the one hand, some commentators argue that borrowers were not
so unsophisticated and that they even aided in the financial crisis by taking
out mortgages they knew they were unable to repay.342 Borrowers of certain
socio-economic status and ethnicity are even blamed as a primary cause of
the financial crisis.343 These commentators do not advocate for industry-wide
337

Loan modifications that include principal reductions can invoke a federal tax
liability for forgiveness of debt or create a taxable event. See MFDRA, supra note 296. If
lenders apply credit to the account, borrowers would, once again, have some options about
how they want to use their equity, as they did in the past by taking out equity to pay other
obligations. In this case, however, the credits would be used to aid the borrowers with the loss
of equity, which was the most significant loss to homeowners from the financial crisis.
338
Id.
339
See generally pond cummings, supra note 59 (discussing the various
perspectives of commentators).
340
Id.
341
See Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2227060.
342
pond cummings, supra note 59.
343
Id.
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regulatory changes, but rather they place the burden back on consumers, who
they argue should better inform themselves through the disclosures the
industry provides.344 This consumer-investor-burdened perspective fails to
take into account that the industry created and placed into the market
products and services that even the most sophisticated, prudent consumerinvestors would have difficulty deciphering. In addition, institutions that
offered these products marketed and sold them to consumers regardless of
consumers’ understanding or lack thereof. To address this problem of
whether or not consumers should decide to invest in a mortgage or securities
transaction, one executive-level member of one of the large financial
institutions told a crowd of lawyers that if consumers of those products take
the risk, then they should bear the responsibility of the decisions they made
because the financial institutions should be able to offer whatever products
they want into the market, despite their level of complexity.345
And yet, others argue that there is too much regulation, especially
given that the BFSI is not a nationalized industry. Some scholars argue that,
even if the government regulates the industry, it may regulate too much
because the government already struggled to create regulation that could take
into account all possible outcomes.346 Even if the government could take into
account all possible scenarios, the ever-changing, complex business
products, services, and structure would leave the government traversing areas
of corporate business that the government does not understand.347
Moreover, some commentators argue that the banks, which are a part
of the BFSI, breached their social contact with the public (through the state),
in that banks obligated themselves to operate prudently given the high level
of public trust offered to them in order for them to competitively function in
the markets.348 Some scholars assert that there exists today, and has always
existed, an interdependent relationship between banks and the state, a
mutual-benefits-and-responsibilities connection, or social contract. This
social contract has existed since the inception of banking in the United States
and has been reinforced over time, but it recently has weakened due to the
growing size and political power of a few banks.349 Some argue that given
the transformed banking landscape, the social contract needs to be reestablished to meet the three main needs of the public: (1) bank safety,
(2) consumer protection, and (3) access to credit.350
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The diverging opinions are not likely to be resolved given the
ongoing neoclassical economic perspective still in effect for the BFSI, even
after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. If regulators and politicians continue
to harbor the notions that regulation is best left to the market and that the
BFSI is in the best position to regulate its own conduct, the practices of the
BFSI will not change. Government safety and soundness standards for the
BFSI will continue to serve only as a benchmark for practices, but the
ultimate control and management of corporate entities will remain with
powerbrokers in the industry and will lord over homeownership policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the BFSI’s financial supremacy and political capital are
roadblocks to any meaningful government action. The BFSI’s influence both
internally and externally on government policy is too great to underestimate,
and to think otherwise is foolish. Until money and power no longer rule the
world, those without it will forever remain subject to those who do. Thus,
most will remain mere pawns of those with a higher greed; and, in the case
of the 2007 financial crisis, the banking industry has checkmate.
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